- Jun 15, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1215)
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- Jun 14, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
For further information see "Control-flow Enforcement Technology Preview" by Intel. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
This is useful in Linux kernel context, in cases data happens to be fragmented and processing can take multiple calls. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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David Benjamin authored
use strict would have caught a number of historical bugs in the perlasm code, some in the repository and some found during review. It even found a fresh masm-only bug (see below). This required some tweaks. The "single instance is enough" globals got switched to proper blessed objects rather than relying on symbolic refs. A few types need $opcode passed in as a result. The $$line thing is a little bit of a nuisance. There may be a clearer pattern to use instead. This even a bug in the masm code. 9b634c9b added logic to make labels global or function-global based on whether something starts with a $, seemingly intended to capture the $decor setting of '$L$'. However, it references $ret which is not defined in label::out. label::out is always called after label::re, so $ret was always the label itself, so the line always ran. I've removed the regular expression so as not to change the behavior of the script. A number of the assembly files now routinely jump across functions, so this seems to be the desired behavior now. GH#1165 Signed-off-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Just like in the other build file templates Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
As well as properly generating those that are made from .in files. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
This turns these headers into build file generated ones. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
'DEPEND[]=file.h' becomes a special way to say that 'file.h' must be generated before anything else is built. It's likely that a number of source files depend on these header files, this provides a simple way to make sure they are always generated even it the dependency data hasn't been added to the build file yet. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The selector field could be omitted because it has a DEFAULT value. In this case *sfld == NULL (sfld can never be NULL). This was not noticed because this was never used in existing ASN.1 modules. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #2949
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Kurt Roeckx authored
ssl_session_hash() always looks at the first 4 bytes, regardless of the length. A client can send a session id that's shorter, and the callback could also generate one that's shorter. So we make sure that the rest of the buffer is initliazed to 0 so that we always calculate the same hash. Found by tis-interpreter, also previously reported as RT #2871 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #2911
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Also changed the code to use "appname" not "filename" Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The function a2i_ASN1_STRING can encounter an error after already allocating a buffer. It wasn't always freeing that buffer on error. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The variable |crtflst| could get double freed in an error path. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The -psk option processing was falling through to the -srp option processing in the ciphers app. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fix a comment following commit c2c49969 . RT2388 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Jun 13, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
VMS C doesn't allow symbols longer than 31 characters. We do the automatic shortening with the library files, but not otherwise (to make sure to work the VMS C magic). For consistency, I shortened other similar symbols in the same manner. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Peter Mosmans authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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TJ Saunders authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1193)
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TJ Saunders authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1193)
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TJ Saunders authored
per review comments. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1193)
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TJ Saunders authored
SSH2 implementations which use DSA_do_verify() and ECDSA_do_verify() are given the R and S values, and the data to be signed, by the client. Thus in order to validate these signatures, SSH2 implementations will digest and sign the data -- and then pass in properly provisioned DSA_SIG and ECDSA_SIG objects. Unfortunately, the existing OpenSSL-1.1.0 APIs do not allow for directly setting those R and S values in these objects, which makes using OpenSSL for such SSH2 implementations much more difficult. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1193)
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