- Jun 24, 2018
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Ana María Martínez Gómez authored
Use `strrchr` to get a pointer to the last occurrence of `.` in the path string, instead of the first one with `strchr`. This prevent the path to be wrongly split if it contains several `.`, and not only the one for the extension. Fixes https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6489 . CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6566)
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- Jun 23, 2018
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The parameters where switched Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #6578
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6558)
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Paul Kehrer authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6540)
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Richard Levitte authored
We don't want an indentation step inside a 'extern "C" {' .. '}' block. Apparently, cc-mode has a c-offsets-alist keyword to allow exactly this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6557)
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- Jun 22, 2018
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
BN_CTX_end() does not handle NULL input, so we must manually check before calling from the cleanup handler. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6502)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6548)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6550)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no need for the preamble. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6515)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Andy Polyakov authored
This makes AIX build procedure behave more like e.g. Solaris. Most notably this makes it possible to pass -Wl,-R,'$(LIBRPATH)' at config time to embed installation destination as library search path into openssl binary. This doesn't imply that other applications have to be linked with -bsvr4, they are free to choose whatever appropriate for given circumstances. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Andy Polyakov authored
AIX treats its shared libraries in unique manner, by placing multiple shared objects of different versions and bitnesses, into .a file. So far we have been naively linking with version-less libcrypto|ssl.so, which poses long-term maintenance problems. One could choose to link straight with libcrypto.so.X.Y [or libcrypto.X.Y.so], but it would be inconsistent with the way AIX [or Unix] does things. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6487)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Fix prototype warnings triggered by -Wstrict-prototypes when configuring with `enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128` Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6556)
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- Jun 21, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
(introduced by commit 91860165 , which added -Wstrict-prototypes) Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6555)
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Shane Lontis authored
Fixed range of random produced in BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex() to be 1 < rand < w-1. It was using 1<= rand < w (which is wrong by 1 on both ends) Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6547)
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David von Oheimb authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6227)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6116)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
[extended tests] Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6542)
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Small simplification by skipping effectively redundant step and not resuming search from point past deletion. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6195)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Add irix-common template that covers even irix-shared from shared-info.pl. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6536)
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Andy Polyakov authored
The goal is to minimize maintenance burden by eliminating somewhat obscure platform-specific tweaks that are not viewed as critical for contemporary applications. This affects Camellia and digest implementations that rely on md32_common.h, MD4, MD5, SHA1, SHA256. SHA256 is the only one that can be viewed as critical, but given the assembly coverage, the omission is considered appropriate. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6508)
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Billy Brumley authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6535)
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Matt Caswell authored
An alpn_selected value containing NUL bytes in it will result in ext.alpn_selected_len having a larger value than the number of bytes allocated in ext.alpn_selected. Issue found by OSS-fuzz. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6507)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6467)
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Matt Caswell authored
This extends the recently added ECDSA signature blinding to blind DSA too. This is based on side channel attacks demonstrated by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group) for ECDSA which are likely to be able to be applied to DSA. Normally, as in ECDSA, during signing the signer calculates: s:= k^-1 * (m + r * priv_key) mod order In ECDSA, the addition operation above provides a sufficient signal for a flush+reload attack to derive the private key given sufficient signature operations. As a mitigation (based on a suggestion from Keegan) we add blinding to the operation so that: s := k^-1 * blind^-1 (blind * m + blind * r * priv_key) mod order Since this attack is a localhost side channel only no CVE is assigned. This commit also tweaks the previous ECDSA blinding so that blinding is only removed at the last possible step. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6522)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6532)
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #6544 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6546)
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Pauli authored
Also fix some clumsy wording. [skip_ci] Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6545)
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- Jun 20, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Hopefully, this will make it more clear that it isn't only ELF specific, even though there is a part that is (or even more restrictively GNU ld.so specific). Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6520)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6538)
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Paul Kehrer authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6528)
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