- Nov 09, 2016
-
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
EasySec authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
-
Emilia Kasper authored
Simple tests only need to implement register_tests(). Tests that need a custom main() should implement test_main(). This will be wrapped in a main() that performs common setup/teardown (currently crypto-mdebug). Note that for normal development, enable-asan is usually sufficient for detecting leaks, and more versatile. enable-crypto-mdebug is stricter as it will also insist that all static variables be freed. This is useful for debugging library init/deinit; however, it also means that test_main() must free everything it allocates. Reviewed-by:
-
EasySec authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Fixes a travis failure Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Nothing is using this yet, it just adds the underlying functions necesary for generating the TLS1.3 secrets. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Normally WPACKETs will use a BUF_MEM which can grow as required. Sometimes though that may be overkill for what is needed - a static buffer may be sufficient. This adds that capability. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
At the moment you can only do an HKDF Extract and Expand in one go. For TLS1.3 we need to be able to do an Extract first, and the subsequently do a number of Expand steps on the same PRK. Reviewed-by: -
FdaSilvaYY authored
Split x509_verify_param_zero code to the right place Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
Matt Caswell authored
There were a few places where they could be declared const so this commit does that. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The name and type of the argument to ssl_check_for_safari() has changed. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
The size if fixed by the protocol and won't change even if sizeof(clienthello.random) does. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Don't use a sub-packet, just load it. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
For consistency with the TLSv1.3 spec. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Add a blank line, take one away - due to feedback received during review. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Based on review feedback received. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
We should be freeing up the raw extension data after we've finished with it. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
In the case of an SSLv2 compat ClientHello we weren't setting up the compression methods correctly, which could lead to uninit reads or crashes. Reviewed-by:
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
Having that code in one central object file turned out to cause trouble when building test/modes_internal_test. Reviewed-by:
-
Richard Levitte authored
For consistency, it's better to use the perl that was specified to Configure last time it was called. Use case: perl v5.8.8 was first along $PATH, perl v5.22.2 was available and specified as: PERL=/opt/local/bin/perl ./config. When make wanted to reconfigure and called './Configure reconf', configuration broke down, complaining about a perl that's too old. Reviewed-by:
-
- Nov 08, 2016
-
-
FdaSilvaYY authored
BN_RECP_CTX_new direclty use bn_init to avoid twice memset calls Reviewed-by:
-
Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Falko Strenzke for bringing this to our attention. Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1882)
-
Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: -
Richard Levitte authored
libssl, not libddl. Reviewed-by:
-
- Nov 07, 2016
-
-
FdaSilvaYY authored
and fix documentation. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
-
Andrea Grandi authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by:
-
David Benjamin authored
MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It appears 5824cc29 added support for VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data. Reviewed-by:
-
David Benjamin authored
PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name. Reviewed-by:
-
David Benjamin authored
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by:
-
