- May 02, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 05aef4bb)
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TJ Saunders authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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TJ Saunders authored
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake, but simply omit/skip that extension. Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo registration. Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Apr 29, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 77076dc9) Conflicts: crypto/x509/x509_err.c crypto/x509/x509_obj.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b33d1141)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 295f3a24)
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- Apr 27, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The traditional private key encryption algorithm doesn't function properly if the IV length of the cipher is zero. These ciphers (e.g. ECB mode) are not suitable for private key encryption anyway. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d78df5df)
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- Apr 26, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
The i2d_X509() function can return a negative value on error. Therefore we should make sure we check it. Issue reported by Yuan Jochen Kang. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 446ba8de)
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- Apr 25, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
This causes a compilation failure when using --strict-warnings in 1.0.2 and 1.0.1 Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Brian Carpenter for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 79356a83)
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Andy Polyakov authored
IBM argues that in certain scenarios capability query is really expensive. At the same time it's asserted that query results can be safely cached, because disabling CPACF is incompatible with reboot-free operation. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 670ad0fb)
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- Apr 23, 2016
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Backport of commits: 79c7f74d bdcd660e from master. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- Apr 22, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If the ASN.1 BIO is presented with a large length field read it in chunks of increasing size checking for EOF on each read. This prevents small files allocating excessive amounts of data. CVE-2016-2109 Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c6298139)
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- Apr 07, 2016
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Andy Polyakov authored
As it turns out branch hints grew as kind of a misconception. In addition their interpretation by GNU assembler is affected by assembler flags and can end up with opposite meaning on different processors. As we have to loose quite a lot on misinterprerations, especially on newer processors, we just omit them altogether. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 20b88bb1)
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David Benjamin authored
Free up parsed X509_NAME structure if the CertificateRequest message contains excess data. The security impact is considered insignificant. This is a client side only leak and a large number of connections to malicious servers would be needed to have a significant impact. This was found by libFuzzer. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- Apr 04, 2016
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Todd Short authored
* Perform ALPN after the SNI callback; the SSL_CTX may change due to that processing * Add flags to indicate that we actually sent ALPN, to properly error out if unexpectedly received. * document ALPN functions * unit tests Backport of commit 817cd0d5 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- Mar 26, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- Mar 18, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
no-comp on Windows was not actually suppressing compilation of the code, although it was suppressing its use. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Ensure we check for a NULL return from OPENSSL_malloc Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If a call to EVP_DecryptUpdate fails then a memory leak could occur. Ensure that the memory is freed appropriately. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
There is a potential double free in EVP_DigestInit_ex. This is believed to be reached only as a result of programmer error - but we should fix it anyway. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ffe9150b)
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- Mar 14, 2016
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> MR: #2341
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- Mar 09, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
If there is cause to think LD_LIBRARY_PATH_32 and LD_PRELOAD_32 are appropriate variables to touch, do so. Otherwise, touch the usual LD_LIBRARY_PATH and LD_PRELOAD. This covers for older installations that don't have a mix of 32-bit and 64-bit libs. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a772e9d0)
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Richard Levitte authored
Submitted by Erik Forsberg <erik@efca.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 86e75432)
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- Mar 08, 2016
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
This improves ABI compatibility when symbol resolution is not lazy. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Mar 07, 2016
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Some OSes, *cough*-dows, insist on stack being "wired" to physical memory in strictly sequential manner, i.e. if stack allocation spans two pages, then reference to farmost one can be punishable by SEGV. But page walking can do good even on other OSes, because it guarantees that villain thread hits the guard page before it can make damage to innocent one... Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit adc4f1fc)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Not all assemblers of "gas" flavour handle binary constants, e.g. seasoned MacOS Xcode doesn't, so give them a hand. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6e42e3ff)
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- Mar 04, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PVK files with abnormally large length or salt fields can cause an integer overflow which can result in an OOB read and heap corruption. However this is an rarely used format and private key files do not normally come from untrusted sources the security implications not significant. Fix by limiting PVK length field to 100K and salt to 10K: these should be more than enough to cover any files encountered in practice. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 5f57abe2)
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- Mar 01, 2016
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Eric S. Raymond authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Update mk1mf.pl to properly handle no-weak-ssl-ciphers Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
and reorganize/harmonize post-conditions. Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from master)
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Andy Polyakov authored
At the same time remove miniscule bias in final subtraction. Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even with key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to be 4% for Sandy Bridge and 7% on Broadwell. CVE-2016-0702 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from master)
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