- Feb 16, 2017
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
The intent seems to be that the WIN32 symbol is for things that are a direct byproduct of being a windows-variant configuration and should be used for feature en/disablement on windows systems. Use of the _WIN32 symbol is more widespread, being used to implement platform portability of more generic code. We do define WIN32 in some situations in e_os.h, but that is not included universally. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2642)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Following on from CVE-2017-3733, this removes the OPENSSL_assert() check that failed and replaces it with a soft assert, and an explicit check of value with an error return if it fails. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS (instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code. The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore, during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur. Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not. CVE-2017-3733 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS (instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code. This commit provides a test for the issue. CVE-2017-3733 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2644)
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Robert Scheck authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2629)
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Kazuki Yamaguchi authored
Fix a typo. Probably this has not been found because EVP_CIPHER_CTX is smaller than EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX and heap overflow does not occur. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2294)
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- Feb 15, 2017
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Andy Polyakov authored
Capability probing by catching SIGILL appears to be problematic on iOS. But since Apple universe is "monocultural", it's actually possible to simply set pre-defined processor capability mask. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2617)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Three modules were left behind in a2859927 . Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2617)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2637)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2636)
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Matt Caswell authored
Causes make update to fail. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2634)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Use negotiated signature algorithm and certificate index in tls_construct_key_exchange instead of recalculating it. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Now the certificate and signature algorithm is set in one place we can use it directly insetad of recalculating it. The old functions ssl_get_server_send_pkey() and ssl_get_server_cert_index() are no longer required. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Update tls_choose_sigalg to choose a signature algorithm for all versions of TLS not just 1.3. For TLS 1.2 we choose the highest preference signature algorithm for the chosen ciphersuite. For TLS 1.1 and earlier the signature algorithm is determined by the ciphersuite alone. For RSA we use a special MD5+SHA1 signature algorithm. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add inline function ssl_has_cert which checks to see if a certificate and private key for a given index are not NULL. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2623)
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- Feb 14, 2017
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FdaSilvaYY authored
[skip ci] Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2571)
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Guido Vranken authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1613)
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Guido Vranken authored
Prevents that OPENSSL_gmtime incorrectly signals success if gmtime_r fails, and that struct* tm result's possibly uninitialized content is used Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1613)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2618)
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Guido Vranken authored
Prevent allocations of size 0 in sh_init, which are not possible with the default OPENSSL_zalloc, but are possible if the user has installed their own allocator using CRYPTO_set_mem_functions. If the 0-allocations succeeds, the secure heap code will later access (at least) the first byte of that space, which is technically an OOB access. This could lead to problems with some custom allocators that only return a valid pointer for subsequent free()-ing, and do not expect that the pointer is actually dereferenced. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2605)
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Robert Scheck authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2300)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2626)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
When a certificate is prepended update the list pointer. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2628)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2624)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
For converting the 2 byte group id into an unsigned int. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Make sure we get an HRR in the right circumstances based on kex mode. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Previously counting the number of tests in checkhandshake.pm took an initial guess and then modified it based on various known special cases. That is becoming increasingly untenable, so this changes it to properly calculate the number of tests we expect to run. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)
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