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  1. Apr 30, 2015
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Clarify logic in BIO_*printf functions · abc7a266
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
      grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
      logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
      incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
      logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
      size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
      make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
      the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
      Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 9d9e3774)
      abc7a266
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Sanity check EVP_EncodeUpdate buffer len · 33c99f2c
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
      zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
      Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
      reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit b86d7dca)
      33c99f2c
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Sanity check EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD · 1a3701f4
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
      least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
      least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
      represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
      Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit c8269881)
      
      Conflicts:
      	ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
      1a3701f4
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Sanity check DES_enc_write buffer length · 4ce06271
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
      is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
      Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 873fb39f)
      4ce06271
  2. Apr 29, 2015
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Add length sanity check in SSLv2 n_do_ssl_write() · c5f8cd7b
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
      code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
      are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.
      
      Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
      Solutions) for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      c5f8cd7b
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Revert "Fix verify algorithm." · 937a7669
      Matt Caswell authored
      This reverts commit 47daa155
      
      .
      
      The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
      the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
      out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
      commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      937a7669
  3. Apr 27, 2015
  4. Apr 24, 2015
  5. Apr 22, 2015
    • Loganaden Velvindron's avatar
      Fix CRYPTO_strdup · 6e5d1307
      Loganaden Velvindron authored
      
      
      The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
      value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
      This patch adds a NULL check.
      
      RT3786
      
      Signed-off-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)
      6e5d1307
  6. Apr 21, 2015
  7. Apr 20, 2015
  8. Apr 18, 2015
  9. Apr 17, 2015
  10. Apr 16, 2015
  11. Apr 14, 2015
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Fix ssl_get_prev_session overrun · 5101c35c
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
      past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
      ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
      underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
      that many bytes.
      
      This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
      too careful.
      
      With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1)
      5101c35c
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Check for ClientHello message overruns · 35bac916
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
      sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
      security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
      needs to be fixed.
      
      With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)
      35bac916
  12. Apr 11, 2015
  13. Apr 10, 2015
  14. Apr 08, 2015
    • Richard Levitte's avatar
      Have mkerr.pl treat already existing multiline string defs properly · 42802a94
      Richard Levitte authored
      
      
      Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
      definitions that spanned two lines.  That in itself is fine, but we
      sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
      automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:
      
          {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
           "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},
      
      However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
      they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
      indicate, for example:
      
          {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
           "No gost certificate sent by peer"},
      
      Clearly not what we wanted.  This change fixes this problem.
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe09)
      42802a94