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  1. Oct 18, 2018
    • Viktor Dukhovni's avatar
      Apply self-imposed path length also to root CAs · a190ea8a
      Viktor Dukhovni authored 
      

Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE
cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate
CAs, but we also counted the leaf).  Therefore, never count the EE
cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly.  This may
be more clear to the reader.

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dc5831da)
      a190ea8a
    • Viktor Dukhovni's avatar
      Only CA certificates can be self-issued · bb692394
      Viktor Dukhovni authored 
      At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and
top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph
of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see:

   This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
   certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
   further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
   certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
   CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
   entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
   the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
   the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued certificates
   are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
   signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
   signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
   certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
   key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
   are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.

that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity
certificates.  In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9


the description of path length constraints says:

   The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
   asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
   keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3).  In this case, it gives the
   maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may
   follow this certificate in a valid certification path.  (Note: The
   last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate
   certificate, and is not included in this limit.  Usually, the last
   certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA
   certificate.)

This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from
the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA
certificates.  A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer
and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the
intermediate certificate count.  The handling of all leaf certificates
must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the
path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued
intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain
of intermediates.

Reviewed-by: default avatarMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed422a2d)
      bb692394
  3. Oct 17, 2018
  5. Oct 16, 2018
    • Dr. Matthias St. Pierre's avatar
      DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large input · dbf0a496
      Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored 
      

In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.

When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.

This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.

Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.

Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.

Fixes #7381

Reviewed-by: default avatarPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)

(cherry picked from commit 3064b551)
      dbf0a496
  7. Oct 15, 2018
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  29. Sep 24, 2018
  31. Sep 23, 2018
    • Bernd Edlinger's avatar
      Create the .rnd file it it does not exist · 1fd6afb5
      Bernd Edlinger authored 
      

It's a bit annoying, since some commands try to read a .rnd file,
and print an error message if the file does not exist.

But previously a .rnd file was created on exit, and that does no longer
happen.

Fixed by continuing in app_RAND_load_conf regardless of the error in
RAND_load_file.

If the random number generator is still not initalized on exit, the
function RAND_write_file will fail and no .rnd file would be created.

Remove RANDFILE from openssl.cnf

Reviewed-by: default avatarKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7217)

(cherry picked from commit 0f582209)
      1fd6afb5