- 26 Sep, 2016 3 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Note: this was accidentally omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2 branch. Without this fix any attempt to use CRLs will crash. CVE-2016-7052 Thanks to Bruce Stephens and Thomas Jakobi for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 22 Sep, 2016 9 commits
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Dirk Feytons authored
Add a missing ifdef. Same change is already present in master. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dmitry Belyavsky authored
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 21 Sep, 2016 9 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts. Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer will be large enough already. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The overflow check will never be triggered because the the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24. Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 776e15f9)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6fcace45)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a19228b7)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room before reading a length. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs. CVE-2016-6306 Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d)
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- 20 Sep, 2016 2 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Check arg count and print an error message. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Marcus Meissner authored
This helps with program code linked against static builds accessing a uninitialized ->engine pointer. CLA: none; trivial Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1540)
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- 15 Sep, 2016 11 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
This reverts commit 15d81749 . There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases like this so we need to have a rethink on this. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
This is needed, because on VMS, select() can only be used on sockets. being able to use select() on all kinds of file descriptors is unique to Unix. So, the solution for VMS is to create a layer that translates input from standard input to socket communication. Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size is specified (implied 32 bit): static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc; ................................................^ %CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared. at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1 Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 14 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
The internal SRP function t_fromb64() converts from base64 to binary. It does not validate that the size of the destination is sufficiently large - that is up to the callers. In some places there was such a check, but not in others. Add an argument to t_fromb64() to provide the size of the destination buffer and validate that we don't write too much data. Also add some sanity checks to the callers where appropriate. With thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 73f0df83)
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- 13 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if we receive an unrecognised warning alert. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 12 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 11 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Backport leak fix from master branch. Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 09 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 08 Sep, 2016 1 commit
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Richard Levitte authored
VMS sets that errno when the device part of a file spec is malformed or a logical name that doesn't exist. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e82e2186)
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