Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2d267179)

This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86d21d0b)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41c9cfbc)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	.gitignore

(cherry picked from commit 04f670cf)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c5e7e1a)

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openssl.org>

ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.

Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.

CVE-2015-0206

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)

Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4138e388)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b691154e)

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod

Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b15f8769)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.

1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.

If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.

2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.

Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.

3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.

Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.

This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).

CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 684400ce)

Conflicts:
	CHANGES
	crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c52816d)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/x_algor.c
	crypto/x509/x509.h

According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated
types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of
these are received with a constructed encoding.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c

is run with --strict-warnings.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 488f16e3)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.

This reverts commit b55ff319

.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7f9edfd2)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55e53026)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1904d211)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9beb948c)

Based on commit 66f96fe2

 by Steve Henson

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ce5ddefc)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d04a1e0b)