Commit b2688c91 authored by Matt Caswell's avatar Matt Caswell
Browse files

Follow on from CVE-2014-3571. This fixes the code that was the original source 


of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Conflicts:
	ssl/d1_pkt.c

Reviewed-by: default avatarDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
parent bf6fa208

ssl/d1_pkt.c

+2 −1
Original line number Diff line number Diff line
@@ -663,7 +663,8 @@ again: 
	 * would be dropped unnecessarily.

	 */

	if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE &&

		*p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&

		s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH &&

		s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) &&

		!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap))

		{

		rr->length = 0;