Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add extension and ciphersuites to trace code.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Check return value when calling ASN1_INTEGER_get to retrieve a certificate
serial number. If an error occurs (which will be caused by the value being
out of range) revert to hex dump of serial number.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.

With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Make update with manual edit so EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item uses the same
ordinal as 1.0.2.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

PR#3872

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ad0fb7f4988c8a717fe6bcb035304385fbdaef41)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so
this build breaks.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier.  Improve the test to match the real C
rules.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Here are the "rules" for handling flags that depend on #ifdef:

- Do not ifdef the enum.  Only ifdef the OPTIONS table.  All ifdef'd
  entries appear at the end; by convention "engine" is last.  This
  ensures that at run-time, the flag will never be recognized/allowed.
  The next two bullets entries are for silencing compiler warnings:
- In the while/switch parsing statement, use #ifdef for the body to
  disable it; leave the "case OPT_xxx:" and "break" statements outside
  the ifdef/ifndef.  See ciphers.c for example.
- If there are multiple options controlled by a single guard, OPT_FOO,
  OPT_BAR, etc., put a an #ifdef around the set, and then do "#else"
  and a series of case labels and a break. See OPENSSL_NO_AES in cms.c
  for example.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

I also re-ordered some of #ifdef's.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER

RT#3888

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3



Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Where we called openssl_cleanse, make sure we do it on all error
paths.  Be consistent in use of sizeof(foo) when possible.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

struct ccs_header_st is not used so it should be removed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Almost two months ago, the warning about non-existing config file was
supressed by setting the environment variable OPENSSL_CONF to /dev/null
everywhere.  Now that this warning is gone, that practice is no longer
needed.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The module loading feature got broken a while ago, so restore it, but
have it a bit more explicit this time around.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT 3871

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Create app_load_config(), a routine to load config file.  Remove the
"always load config" from the main app.  Change the places that used to
load config to call the new common routine.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>