Since SNI will typically switch the SSL_CTX structure to the one
corresponding to the appopriate server we need to parse custom
extensions using the switched SSL_CTX not the original one. This
is done by parsing custom extensions *after* SNI.
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9f4bd9d5)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.

RT: 3575
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set
the method to NULL.  We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things.  This is a
regression introduced in 62f45cc2

.  Keep the old
method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time.

CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 392fa7a9)

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c882abd5)

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 87d388c9)

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3568

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3567

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5dc6070a03779cd524f0e67f76c945cb0ac38320)

Related to CVE-2014-3513

This fix was developed by the OpenSSL Team

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	util/mkdef.pl
	util/ssleay.num

Conflicts:
	util/mkdef.pl

CVE-2014-3513

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th September 2014, based on an original
issue and patch developed by the LibreSSL project. Further analysis of the issue
was performed by the OpenSSL team.

The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT: 3553
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 69d5747f)

handling out of #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 section.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support, restoring a reviewed state instead.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <(steve@openssl.org)>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Patch supplied by Matthieu Patou <mat@matws.net>, and modified to also
remove duplicate definition of PKCS7_type_is_digest.

PR#3551

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fdea3e)

Reviewed-by: Geoffrey Thorpe <geoff@geoffthorpe.net>

If data is NULL, return the size needed to hold the
derived key.  No other API to do this, so document
the behavior.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5aed1693)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9208640a)

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 55c7a4cf)

Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65df



Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d)

so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5886354d)

RT: 3541
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8b07c005)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 40155f40)

Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4aac102f)

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c

(Original commit adb46dbc

)

Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 455b65df)

that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant
time.

(cherry picked from commit adb46dbc

)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>