These are implemented as macros delegating to `EVP_DigestUpdate`, which
takes a `size_t` as its third argument, not an `unsigned int`.

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8bdce8d1)

If len == 0 in a call to ERR_error_string_n() then we can read beyond the
end of the buffer. Really applications should not be calling this function
with len == 0, but we shouldn't be letting it through either!

Thanks to Agostino Sarubbo for reporting this issue. Agostino's blog on
this issue is available here:
https://blogs.gentoo.org/ago/2016/10/14/openssl-libcrypto-stack-based-buffer-overflow-in-err_error_string_n-err-c/



Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5c13615)

The SWEET32 fix moved 3DES from HIGH to MEDIUM, but omitted SSL2.

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1683)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1702)
(cherry picked from commit 7954dced)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Before loading a key from an engine, it may need to be initialized.
When done loading the key, we must de-initialize the engine.
(if the engine is already initialized somehow, only the reference
counter will be incremented then decremented)

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 49e476a5)

This reverts commit 4badd2b3

.
This fails to call ENGINE_finish; an alternate fix is coming.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Things like 'openssl s_client' only ever worked with keys from an engine
which provided a default generic method for some key type — because it
called ENGINE_set_default() and that ended up being an implicit
initialisation and functional refcount.

But an engine which doesn't provide generic methods doesn't get
initialised, and then when you try to use it you get an error:

cannot load client certificate private key file from engine
140688147056384:error:26096075:engine routines:ENGINE_load_private_key:not initialised:crypto/engine/eng_pkey.c:66:
unable to load client certificate private key file

cf. https://github.com/OpenSC/libp11/issues/107

 (in which we discover
that engine_pkcs11 *used* to provide generic methods that OpenSSL would
try to use for ephemeral DH keys when negotiating ECDHE cipher suites in
TLS, and that didn't work out very well.)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1640)

The NEWS file referenced the wrong CVE for 1.0.2

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Note: this was accidentally omitted from OpenSSL 1.0.2 branch.
Without this fix any attempt to use CRLs will crash.

CVE-2016-7052

Thanks to Bruce Stephens and Thomas Jakobi for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add a missing ifdef. Same change is already present in master.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1100)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against
OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer
will be large enough already.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The overflow check will never be triggered because the
the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 776e15f9)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6fcace45)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a19228b7)

In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and
ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room
before reading a length.

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs.

CVE-2016-6306

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL
before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d)

Check arg count and print an error message.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This helps with program code linked against static builds accessing a uninitialized ->engine pointer.

CLA: none; trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1540)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This reverts commit 15d81749

.

There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a
warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a
Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the
connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases
like this so we need to have a rethink on this.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>