This warning breaks the build in 1.0.0 and 0.9.8

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b1ffc6ca)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86d21d0b)

Update the X509v3 name parsing to allow multiple xn-- international
domain name indicators in a name.  Previously, only allowed one at
the beginning of a name, which was wrong.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 31d1d374)

It contained a date on when it was build.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 41c9cfbc)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	.gitignore

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c5e7e1a)

ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.

Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.

CVE-2015-0206

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 652ff0f4796eecd8729b4690f2076d1c7ccb2862)

Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 56df92efb6893abe323307939425957ce878c8f0)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4a4d4158)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e464403d)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4138e388)

context was also inherited (matches that of the existing SSL_CTX).

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ac8e9cbe)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cb62ab4b)

Change by SteveH from original by John Denker (in the RT)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 77ff1f3b)

Fix memory leak by freeing up saved_message.data if it is not NULL.

PR#3489
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 41cd41c4)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b691154e)

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

This is re-commit without unrelated modification.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 0548505f)

This reverts commit caeed719

.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4fec9150)

This facilitates "universal" builds, ones that target multiple
architectures, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv7. See commentary in
Configure for details.

Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c1669e1c)

Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit b15f8769)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 31c65a7b)

when its SSL_CTX is updated.

From BoringSSL commit
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/a5dc545bbcffd9c24cebe65e9ab5ce72d4535e3a



Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 61aa44ca)

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4c52816d)

By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a
certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature.
Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed
this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the
certificate fingerprint for blacklists.

1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits.

If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject
the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits.

2. Check certificate algorithm consistency.

Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the
certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure
errors for some broken certificates.

3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER.

Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received
signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch.

This will reject various cases including garbage after signature
(thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS
program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs
(negative or with leading zeroes).

CVE-2014-8275
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 684400ce)

RT3638

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

RT3638

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c

This change documents the world as-is, by turning all warnings on,
and then turning warnings that trigger off again.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT: 3607
Reviewed-by: Adam Langley <agl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9e557ab2)

Check for NULL return from X509_NAME_ENTRY_new()

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2c60925d)

Since SGC has been removed from OpenSSL 1.0.2 the
SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE is no longer used. However the #define is
retained for compatibility.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 63eab8a6)

When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 4f605ccb)

Conflicts:
	ssl/t1_lib.c

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>