- Feb 17, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2641)
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- Feb 16, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #2220 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2645)
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- Feb 15, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2554)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2639)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2625)
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- Feb 14, 2017
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2571) (cherry picked from commit 7e12cdb5)
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Guido Vranken authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1613) (cherry picked from commit 7c120357)
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Yuchi authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2559) (cherry picked from commit e0670973)
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- Feb 13, 2017
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Darren Tucker authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2604) (cherry picked from commit ca423a69)
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David Benjamin authored
While it's always safe to read |SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH| bytes from an |SSL_SESSION|'s |session_id| array, the hash function would do so with without considering if all those bytes had been written to. This change checks |session_id_length| before possibly reading uninitialised memory. Since the result of the hash function was already attacker controlled, and since a lookup of a short session ID will always fail, it doesn't appear that this is anything more than a clean up. In particular, |ssl_get_prev_session| uses a stack-allocated placeholder |SSL_SESSION| as a lookup key, so the |session_id| array may be uninitialised. This was originally found with libFuzzer and MSan in https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/e976e4349d693b4bbb97e1694f45be5a1b22c8c7, then by Robert Swiecki with honggfuzz and MSan here. Thanks to both. (cherry picked from commit bd5d27c1 ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2583)
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- Feb 09, 2017
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Matt Hauck authored
This only manifested itself with FIPS enabled statically linked engines. The OPENSSL_init call ended up invoking RAND_init_fips for a FIPS enabled build, which called CRYPTO_malloc, resulting in disallowing the engine to finish its IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN call. (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)Reviewed-by : Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> CLA: trivial (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- enable ssl3_init_finished_mac to return an error - don't continue the SSL state machine if that happens in ssl3_connect: - if ssl3_setup_buffer fails also set state to SSL_ST_ERR for consistency Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2130)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- add error handling in ssl3_generate_key_block and ssl3_change_cipher_state Fixes #2114 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2137)
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- Feb 08, 2017
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Todd Short authored
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes. However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things can happen: 1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket. 2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0 the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when trying to encrypt the session ticket. To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected ticket flag. To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable error, and write a 0 leng...
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- Feb 07, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Graeme Perrow for reporting and providing a possible fix. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2565)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2567)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
calling OPENSSL_cleanse() Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2149)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
or EVP_CTRL_INIT/EVP_CTRL_COPY was not called or failed. - if that happens set cipher = NULL. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2149)
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- Feb 06, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixed a memory leak in ASN1_digest and ASN1_item_digest. asn1_template_noexp_d2i call ASN1_item_ex_free(&skfield,...) on error. Reworked error handling in asn1_item_ex_combine_new: - call ASN1_item_ex_free and return the correct error code if ASN1_template_new failed. - dont call ASN1_item_ex_free if ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE failed. Reworked error handing in x509_name_ex_d2i and x509_name_encode. Fixed error handling in int_ctx_new and EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup. Fixed a memory leak in def_get_class if lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_insert fails due to OOM: - to figure out if the insertion succeeded, use lh_EX_CLASS_ITEM_retrieve again. - on error, p will be NULL, and gen needs to be cleaned up again. int_free_ex_data needs to have a fallback solution if unable to allocate "storage": - if free_func is non-zero this must be called to clean up all memory. Fixed error handling in pkey_hmac_copy. Fixed error handling in ssleay_rand_add and ssleay_rand_bytes. Fixed error handling in ...
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- Feb 05, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2352) (cherry picked from commit fe4075f2)
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- Jan 31, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
If someone tries this: MAKE='make -j8' ./config then Configure ends up doing this: make -j8 links depend gentests Doing those three in parallell leads to a race condition that may very well cause issue such as tests not being run (because they all get linked to a dummy that does nothing instead of the real test). To mitigate this, execute the three targets in one make call each. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2332)
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- Jan 27, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
The ! command doesn't exist on all Unix family operating systems, so don't use it. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2303)
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- Jan 26, 2017
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2298)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
When the client reads DH parameters from the TLS stream, we only checked that they all are non-zero. This change updates the check as follows: check that p is odd check that 1 < g < p - 1 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
CVE-2017-3732 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Originally a crash in 32-bit build was reported CHACHA20-POLY1305 cipher. The crash is triggered by truncated packet and is result of excessive hashing to the edge of accessible memory (or bogus MAC value is produced if x86 MD5 assembly module is involved). Since hash operation is read-only it is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS condition. Thanks to Robert Święcki for report. CVE-2017-3731 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Jan 24, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2132) (cherry picked from commit 7928ee4d)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- s == NULL can mean c is a new session *or* lh_insert was unable to create a hash entry. - use lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve to check for this error condition. - If it happens simply remove the extra reference again. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2138) (cherry picked from commit 38088ce9)
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- Jan 23, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
The flag SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is documented as follows: B<Server mode:> only request a client certificate on the initial TLS/SSL handshake. Do not ask for a client certificate again in case of a renegotiation. This flag must be used together with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. B<Client mode:> ignored But the implementation actually did nothing. After the server sends its ServerKeyExchange message, the code was checking s->session->peer to see if it is NULL. If it was set then it did not ask for another client certificate. However s->session->peer will only be set in the event of a resumption, but a ServerKeyExchange message is only sent in the event of a full handshake (i.e. no resumption). The documentation suggests that the original intention was for this to have an effect on renegotiation, and resumption doesn't come into it. The fix is to properly check for renegotiation, not whether there is already a client certificate in the session. As far as I can tell this has been broken for a *long* time. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1984)
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- Jan 20, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2267)
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Richard Levitte authored
When setting the digest parameter for DSA parameter generation, the signature MD was set instead of the parameter generation one. Fortunately, that's also the one that was used for parameter generation, but it ultimately meant the parameter generator MD and the signature MD would always be the same. Fixes github issue #2016 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2250) (cherry picked from commit 8a05c4d3)
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- Jan 18, 2017
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1906) (cherry picked from commit 2191dc84)
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- Jan 11, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2209)
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- Jan 10, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Dont free rbuf_freelist here, SSL_CTX_free will do that. Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #2129
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- Jan 09, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #2140 (cherry picked from commit c6d215e0)
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- Dec 29, 2016
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Markus Triska authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> CLA: trivial (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2145) (cherry picked from commit 67adf0a7)
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- Dec 20, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2121) (cherry picked from commit 2629440d)
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