- Aug 18, 2017
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d3d880ce)
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- Aug 17, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4145) (cherry picked from commit 524fdd51)
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- Aug 16, 2017
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David von Oheimb authored
Now the certs arg is not any more neglected when building the signer cert chain. Added case to test/recipes/80-test_ocsp.t proving fix for 3-level CA hierarchy. See also http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=4620 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4124) (cherry picked from commit 121738d1)
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Todd Short authored
WebSphere application server cannot handle having an empty extension (e.g. EMS/EtM) as the last extension in a client hello. This moves the SigAlgs extension last (before any padding) for TLSv1.2 to avoid this issue. Force the padding extension to a minimum length of 1. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3927)
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- Aug 10, 2017
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Fix warning and don't use binary field certificate for ECDH CMS key only test. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4134) (cherry picked from commit ed5c7ea2)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4134) (cherry picked from commit 1aee92bf)
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- Aug 09, 2017
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Xiaoyin Liu authored
In the generated HTML document, the `<pre>` tag is not closed. This patch also has a trivial code-style improvement, unrelated to the bug fix. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4088) (cherry picked from commit 1a9f5cf0)
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- Aug 08, 2017
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4115) (cherry picked from commit 3f1d1704)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4115) (cherry picked from commit 5d09b003)
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- Aug 07, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4111) (cherry picked from commit db854bb1)
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- Aug 05, 2017
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Xiaoyin Liu authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #4093 (cherry picked from commit c9a41d7d)
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- Aug 03, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
This needs more change that what is appropriate for the 1.1.0 branch. This reverts commit 04011100 . Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Lingmo Zhu authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4014) (cherry picked from commit 5bd05e57)
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Lingmo Zhu authored
The comment "The following should not return 1, otherwise, things are very strange" is from the very first commit of OpenSSL. The really meaning of the comment is if the identical session can be found from internal cache after calling get_session_cb but not found before calling get_session_cb, it is just strange. The value 1 was originated from the old doc of SSLeay, reversed from the actual return value of SSL_CTX_add_session(). Anyway either return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() should not interrupt the session resumption process. So the checking of return value of SSL_CTX_add_session() is not necessary. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4014) (cherry picked from commit e29bb834)
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- Aug 01, 2017
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Paul Yang authored
Seems this documentation is not dead, so add this missing part Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4037) (cherry picked from commit 003ef7ef)
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Ken Goldman authored
Document that the RSA_get0_ functions permit a NULL BIGNUM **. Those output parameters are ignored. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4064) (cherry picked from commit 07c54e59)
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- Jul 31, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
The memory blocks contain secret data and must be cleared before returning to the system heap. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4062) (cherry picked from commit e670db01)
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Xiaoyin Liu authored
TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO means "SSLv3/TLS read next proto" Fix typo in the message for TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4054) (cherry picked from commit f978f2b8)
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Xiaoyin Liu authored
I think it's better to use `GetFileAttributes` to obtain the attributes of a file than `FindFirstFile`. If the input name contains `*`, this function should return failure rather than check whether the first match happens to be a file or a directory. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3991) (cherry picked from commit 5bd051a0)
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- Jul 29, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4048)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Use OPENSSL_secure_clear_free for secure mem BIOs and X25519 private keys. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4048)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
and d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio before it goes out of scope. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4047) (cherry picked from commit 02fd47c8)
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- Jul 28, 2017
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Paul Yang authored
original problem: if a private key is invaild, nothing outputted. the error filter in apps/rsa.c is not working any more. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4043) (cherry picked from commit 03883e7e)
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Paul Yang authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4036) (cherry picked from commit dbd007d7)
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Richard Levitte authored
File::Glob::glob is deprecated, it's use generates this kind of message: File::Glob::glob() will disappear in perl 5.30. Use File::Glob::bsd_glob() instead. at ../master/Configure line 277. So instead, use a construction that makes the caller glob() use File::Glob::bsd_glob(). Note that we're still excluding VMS, as it's directory specs use '[' and ']', which have a different meaning with bsd_glob and would need some extra quoting. This might change, but later. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4040) (cherry picked from commit 102c9e12)
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- Jul 27, 2017
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David Benjamin authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4023) (cherry picked from commit d67e7554)
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- Jul 26, 2017
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Emeric Brun authored
In 'crypto/rand/ossl_rand.c', a call to 'ASYNC_unblock_pause()' is missing in an error case. CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (cherry picked from commit e4b16013) (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4024)
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Emilia Kasper authored
Fixed in 5b8fa431 [ci skip] Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3924)
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Pauli authored
In function wait_for_async(), allocated async fds is freed if `SSL_get_all_async_fds` fails, but later `fds` is used. Interestingly, it is not freed when everything succeeds. Rewrite the FD set loop to make it more readable and to not modify the allocated pointer so it can be freed. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3992) (cherry picked from commit 0a345252)
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- Jul 25, 2017
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Andy Polyakov authored
"Optimize" is in quotes because it's rather a "salvage operation" for now. Idea is to identify processor capability flags that drive Knights Landing to suboptimial code paths and mask them. Two flags were identified, XSAVE and ADCX/ADOX. Former affects choice of AES-NI code path specific for Silvermont (Knights Landing is of Silvermont "ancestry"). And 64-bit ADCX/ADOX instructions are effectively mishandled at decode time. In both cases we are looking at ~2x improvement. Hardware used for benchmarking courtesy of Atos, experiments run by Romain Dolbeau <romain.dolbeau@atos.net>. Kudos! This is minimalistic backpoint of 64d92d74 Thanks to David Benjamin for spotting typo in Knights Landing detection! Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4006)
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- Jul 24, 2017
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3898) (cherry picked from commit 18437871)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3898) (cherry picked from commit d0f6eb1d)
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Xiaoyin Liu authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4000) (cherry picked from commit e0de4dd5)
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lolyonok authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3934) (cherry picked from commit 386e9169)
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Richard Levitte authored
There's a case when the environment variable OPENSSL_CONF is useless... when cross compiling for mingw and your wine environment has an environment variable OPENSSL_CONF. The latter will override anything that's given when starting wine and there make the use of that environment variable useless in our tests. Therefore, we should not trust it, and use explicit '-config' options instead. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3994) (cherry picked from commit 83e0d090)
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Richard Levitte authored
Makefile.shared was designed to figure out static library names, shared library names, library version compatibility, import library names and the like on its own. This was a design for pre-1.1.0 OpenSSL because the main Makefile didn't have all that knowledge. With 1.1.0, the situation isn't the same, a lot more knowledge is included in the main Makefile, and while Makefile.shared did things right most of the time (there are some corner cases, such as the choice of .sl or .so as DSO extension on some HPUX versions), there's still an inherent fragility when one has to keep an eye on Makefile.shared to make sure it produces what the main Makefile produces. This change simplifies Makefile.shared by removing all its "intelligence" and have it depend entirely on the input from the main Makefile instead. That way, all the naming is driven from configuration data. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3983) (cherry picked f...
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- Jul 23, 2017
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Johannes Bauer authored
Changes the EC_KEY_METHOD_get_* family to not need a EC_KEY_METHOD* as its first parameter, but a const EC_KEY_METHOD*, which is entirely sufficient. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> GH: #3985 (cherry picked from commit 4e9b720e)
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- Jul 19, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
The intention of the removed code was to check if the previous operation carried. However this does not work. The "mask" value always ends up being a constant and is all ones - thus it has no effect. This check is no longer required because of the previous commit. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3832) (cherry picked from commit d5475e31)
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Matt Caswell authored
In TLS mode of operation the padding value "pad" is obtained along with the maximum possible padding value "maxpad". If pad > maxpad then the data is invalid. However we must continue anyway because this is constant time code. We calculate the payload length like this: inp_len = len - (SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + pad + 1); However if pad is invalid then inp_len ends up -ve (actually large +ve because it is a size_t). Later we do this: /* verify HMAC */ out += inp_len; len -= inp_len; This ends up with "out" pointing before the buffer which is undefined behaviour. Next we calculate "p" like this: unsigned char *p = out + len - 1 - maxpad - SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH; Because of the "out + len" term the -ve inp_len value is cancelled out so "p" points to valid memory (although technically the pointer arithmetic is undefined behaviour again). We only ever then dereference "p" and never "out" directly so there is never an invalid read based on the bad pointer - so there is no security issue. This commit fixes the undefined behaviour by ensuring we use maxpad in place of pad, if the supplied pad is invalid. With thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3832) (cherry picked from commit 335d0a46)
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- Jul 18, 2017
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Emilia Kasper authored
This is an inherent weakness of the padding mode. We can't make the implementation constant time (see the comments in rsa_pk1.c), so add a warning to the docs. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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