- 27 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified. Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely undocumented). The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message. This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER. There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the implementation of ssl3_write: /* This is an experimental flag that sends the * last handshake message in the same packet as the first * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during * session-id reuse */ It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay. This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 23 Jul, 2015 2 commits
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 22 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Create bn_free_d utility routine and use it. Fix RT3950 Also a missing cleanse, from Loganaden Velvindron (loganaden@gmail.com), who noticed it in a Cloudflare patch. Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 21 Jul, 2015 4 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Use new SSL_CONF options in demo. Add intermediate and root CAs and update all to use SHA256. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add support for loading verify and chain stores in SSL_CONF. Commands to set verify mode and client CA names. Add documentation. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 20 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Removed ability to set ex_data impl at runtime. This removed these three functions: const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation(void); int CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *i); int CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class(void); It is no longer possible to change the ex_data implementation at runtime. (Luckily those functions were never documented :) Also removed the ability to add new exdata "classes." We don't believe this received much (if any) use, since you can't add it to OpenSSL objects, and there are probably better (native) methods for developers to add their own extensible data, if they really need that. Replaced the internal hash table (of per-"class" stacks) with a simple indexed array. Reserved an index for "app" application. Each API used to take the lock twice; now it only locks once. Use local stack storage for function pointers, rather than malloc, if possible (i.e., number of ex_data items is under a dozen). Make CRY...
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- 18 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 16 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Rich Salz authored
Remove support for RSA_NET and Netscape key format (-keyform n). Also removed documentation of SGC. Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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- 15 Jul, 2015 4 commits
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mancha authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
This reverts commit e5c0bc6c . Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ernie Hershey authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 14 Jul, 2015 2 commits
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by:
Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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GitHub User authored
Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 13 Jul, 2015 3 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
This leaves behind files with names ending with '.iso-8859-1'. These should be safe to remove. If something went wrong when re-encoding, there will be some files with names ending with '.utf8' left behind. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
This requires 'iconv' and that 'file' can take the options '-b' and '-i'. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes GH#330 Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 10 Jul, 2015 2 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we already expect that tar variant). Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 09 Jul, 2015 6 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Peter Waltenberg authored
Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 07 Jul, 2015 8 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fills in the help text for a number of options to verify that were blank. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs: 1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising in between. 2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes the value of |ctx->chain| directly. With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should not be supported to allow this. With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined. Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793. Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional verification tests. Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error. Patch provided by the BoringSSL project. CVE-2015-1793 Reviewed-by:
Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
There's no reason why we should default to a output format that is old, and confusing in some cases. This affects the commands "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509". Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 06 Jul, 2015 2 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows the tag length to be set without requiring the tag. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 30 Jun, 2015 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 29 Jun, 2015 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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