- Dec 17, 2014
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
From BoringSSL - Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted. - Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4aecfd4d)
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Bodo Möller authored
master branch has a specific regression test for a bug in x86_64-mont5 code, see commit cdfe0fdd . This code is now in 1.0.2/1.0.1, so also backport the test. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Invalid zero-padding in the divisor could cause a division by 0. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Dec 16, 2014
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
(cherry picked from commit 66f96fe2 ) Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
ssl_locl.h Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Adam Langley authored
The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange. This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way, version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS. (From BoringSSL) Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ec1af3c4)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit db812f2d)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit af6e2d51)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55e53026)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1904d211)
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- Dec 15, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
The temporary variable causes unused variable warnings in opt mode with clang, because the subsequent assert is compiled out. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Dec 13, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- Dec 08, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 41bf2501)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 76e65090)
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- Dec 05, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 376e2ca3)
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Emilia Kasper authored
Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless, be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads. Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released versions of OpenSSL are not affected. Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 33d5ba86)
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- Dec 04, 2014
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Richard Levitte authored
RT3596 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Dec 03, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4bb8eb9c)
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Matt Caswell authored
than the mtu we are already using Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 047f2159)
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Matt Caswell authored
and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g. if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 464ce920)
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Matt Caswell authored
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit fixes that. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d3d9eef3)
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Matt Caswell authored
at least the minimum or it will fail. There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum mtu to use. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1620a2e4)
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Matt Caswell authored
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 59669b6a) Conflicts: ssl/d1_both.c
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Matt Caswell authored
used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8 bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP). This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 0d3ae34d)
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Matt Caswell authored
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query checks consistent. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 6abb0d1f)
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Matt Caswell authored
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead. Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 00123577)
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Matt Caswell authored
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cf75017b)
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- Dec 02, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
If SSLv2 and SSLv3 are both disabled we still support SSL/TLS. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Nov 28, 2014
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A"). This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required for the retry code path. Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh). Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8123d158)
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Alok Menghrajani authored
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its readability. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 03b637a7)
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- Nov 27, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f9ea4deb)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit eceef8fb)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 81ec01b2)
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