CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4705)

Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)

 * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212–223
                                                                 ^
The EN DASH ('–') in this line is one UTF-8 character (hex: e2 80 93).
Under some code page setting (e.g. 936), Visual Studio may report C4819
warning: The file contains a character that cannot be represented in the
current code page.

Replace this character with the ASCII char '-' (Hex Code: 2D).

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4691)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4677)

In earlier 5.1x Perl versions quoting globs works only if there is
white space. If there is none, it's looking for names starting with ".

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4695)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

We were using OPENSSL_strdup() unnecessarily and then failing to free it. There is
no reason to use OPENSSL_strdup() in this scenario - so just remove it.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4699)

HP-UX make doesn't recognize $< in explict target rules, only in
inference ones such as .c.o.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4697)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4703)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4702)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4457)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4457)

'rsa', 'sha' and 'tlsext' can't be disabled, not even as a consequence
of other conditions, so having cascading disables that depend on them
is futile.  Clean up!

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4693)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4692)

If SSL_read() is called with a zero length buffer, and we read a zero length
record then we should mark that record as read.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4685)

Normally TLSProxy waits for the s_server process to finish before
continuing. However in cases where serverconnects > 1 we need to keep the
s_server process around for a later test so we continue immediately. This
means that TAP test output can end up being printed to stdout at the same
time as s_server is printing stuff. This confuses the test runner and can
cause spurious test failures. This commit introduces a small delay in cases
where serverconnects > 1 in order to give s_server enough time to finish
what it was doing before we continue to the next test.

Fixes #4129

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4660)

There were 4 macros in ocsp.h that have not worked since 1.1.0 because
they attempt to access the internals of an opaque structure.

For OCSP_REQUEST_sign() applications should use OCSP_request_sign() instead.
For OCSP_BASICRESP_sign() applications should use OCSP_basic_sign() instead.
For OCSP_REQUEST_verify() applications should use OCSP_request_verify()
instead.
For OCSP_BASICRESP_verify() applications should use OCSP_basic_verify()
instead.

Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4635)

The Chinese cryptographic operations should appear in the disabled list if they
are disabled.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4678)

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4616)

SM3 is a secure hash function which is part of the Chinese
"Commercial Cryptography" suite of algorithms which use is
required for certain commercial applications in China.

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4616)

Based on patch from Tomasz Moń:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mailing.openssl.dev/fQxXvCg1uQY



Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1008)

It's not clear if it's a feature or bug, but binutils-2.29[.1]
interprets 'adr' instruction with Thumb2 code reference differently,
in a way that affects calculation of addresses of constants' tables.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4669)

Do not try to fuzz-test structures/routines that are compiled
out of the library due to library configuration.

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4664)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)

CLA: trivial

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4600)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4653

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4648

b2 being negative is ignored

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4648

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
GH: #4648

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4652)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Credit to OSS-Fuzz for finding this.

CVE-2017-3736

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In OpenSSL pre 1.1.0, 'openssl x509 -CAkeyformat engine' was possible
and supported.  In 1.1.0, a small typo ('F' instead of 'f') removed
that possibility.  This restores the pre 1.1.0 behavior.

Fixes #4366

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4643)

information about the length of the scalar used in ECDSA operations
from a large number (2^32) of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)

information about the length of a value used in DSA operations from
a large number of signatures.

This doesn't rate as a CVE because:

* For the non-constant time code, there are easier ways to extract
  more information.

* For the constant time code, it requires a significant number of signatures
  to leak a small amount of information.

Thanks to Neals Fournaise, Eliane Jaulmes and Jean-Rene Reinhard for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4576)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4637)

It turns out that (some?) fuzzers can read a dictionary of OIDs,
so we generate one as part of the usual 'make update'.

Fixes #4615

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4637)