Fix a bug in handling of 128 byte long PSK identity in
psk_client_callback.

OpenSSL supports PSK identities of up to (and including) 128 bytes in
length. PSK identity is obtained via the psk_client_callback,
implementors of which are expected to provide a NULL-terminated
identity. However, the callback is invoked with only 128 bytes of
storage thus making it impossible to return a 128 byte long identity and
the required additional NULL byte.

This CL fixes the issue by passing in a 129 byte long buffer into the
psk_client_callback. As a safety precaution, this CL also zeroes out the
buffer before passing it into the callback, uses strnlen for obtaining
the length of the identity returned by the callback, and aborts the
handshake if the identity (without the NULL terminator) is longer than
128 bytes.

(Original patch amended to achieve strnlen in a different way.)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit be0d8517)

(cherry picked from commit 2b0180c3

)

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>

string returns 0 with errno = ENOENT.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 360928b7)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6a14fe75)

"inline" without static is not correct as the compiler may choose to ignore it
and will then either emit an external definition, or expect one.

Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 86f50b36)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4d86e8df)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9d6253cf)

The doc says that port can be "*" to mean any port.
That's wrong.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 07e3b31f)

PR2693

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5d33b70ef5a4768fdfb77a73f9817c4570613039)

Pull constant-time methods out to a separate header, add tests.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e7169a58)

Conflicts:
	ssl/Makefile
	test/Makefile

The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 82dc08de54ce443c2a9ac478faffe79e76157795)

When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed383f847156940e93f256fed78599873a4a9b28)

Conflicts:
	doc/crypto/EC_KEY_new.pod

This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b391570bdeb386d4fd325917c248d593d3c43930)

I also removed some trailing whitespace and cleaned
up the "see also" list.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b3e11c5)

The description of when the server creates a DH key is
confusing.  This cleans it up.
(rsalz: also removed trailing whitespace.)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

The EXAMPLE that used FILE and RC2 doesn't compile due to a
few minor errors.  Tweak to use IDEA and AES-128. Remove
examples about RC2 and RC5.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>

This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b)

Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.

Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a8)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e19c9381)

Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a)

In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx



Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a)

eliminating them as dead code.

Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.

(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a6

)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a90b1e32)

PR#3450

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

group_order_tests (ectest.c).  Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h).

Reviewed-by:  <emilia@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/ec/ectest.c

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3509
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.

CVE-2014-3508

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3510

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3511

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.

Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.

Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.

This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.

Fixes CVE-2014-3507

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.

In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.

Fixes CVE-2014-3506

Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.

Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74

 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).

Fixes CVE-2014-3505

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

(cherry picked from commit 27131fe8

)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>