Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use
long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is
on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest
specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards
compatibility.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a
mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested
NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore
the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious
server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As
this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not
occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation,
sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will
be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a
Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a
default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP.
Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.

I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar
problem but I could not find any other issues.

CVE-2016-6304

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that
no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts.
Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Grow TLS/DTLS 16 bytes more than strictly necessary as a precaution against
OOB reads. In most cases this will have no effect because the message buffer
will be large enough already.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The overflow check will never be triggered because the
the n2l3 result is always less than 2^24.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 776e15f9)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6fcace45)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a19228b7)

In ssl3_get_client_certificate, ssl3_get_server_certificate and
ssl3_get_certificate_request check we have enough room
before reading a length.

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting these bugs.

CVE-2016-6306

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

We should check the last BN_CTX_get() call to ensure that it isn't NULL
before we try and use any of the allocated BIGNUMs.

Issue reported by Shi Lei.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 1ff7425d)

Check arg count and print an error message.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This helps with program code linked against static builds accessing a uninitialized ->engine pointer.

CLA: none; trivial

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1540)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This reverts commit 15d81749

.

There were some unexpected side effects to this commit, e.g. in SSLv3 a
warning alert gets sent "no_certificate" if a client does not send a
Certificate during Client Auth. With the above commit this causes the
connection to abort, which is incorrect. There may be some other edge cases
like this so we need to have a rethink on this.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This is needed, because on VMS, select() can only be used on sockets.  being
able to use select() on all kinds of file descriptors is unique to Unix.

So, the solution for VMS is to create a layer that translates input from
standard input to socket communication.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Backport leak fix from master branch.

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Thanks to Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This fixes the following error when building with no particular pointer size
is specified (implied 32 bit):

    static void *(*realloc_func) (void *, size_t) = realloc;
    ................................................^
    %CC-E-UNDECLARED, In the initializer for realloc_func, "_realloc32" is not declared.
    at line number 93 in file DEV:[OPENSSL102.crypto]mem.c;1

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The internal SRP function t_fromb64() converts from base64 to binary. It
does not validate that the size of the destination is sufficiently large -
that is up to the callers. In some places there was such a check, but not
in others.

Add an argument to t_fromb64() to provide the size of the destination
buffer and validate that we don't write too much data. Also add some sanity
checks to the callers where appropriate.

With thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 73f0df83)

A peer continually sending unrecognised warning alerts could mean that we
make no progress on a connection. We should abort rather than continuing if
we receive an unrecognised warning alert.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Backport leak fix from master branch.

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this bug.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

VMS sets that errno when the device part of a file spec is malformed
or a logical name that doesn't exist.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e82e2186)

Some hardware devices don't provide the public EC_POINT data. The only
way for X509_check_private_key() to validate that the key matches a
given certificate is to actually perform a sign operation and then
verify it using the public key in the certificate.

Maybe that can come later, as discussed in issue 1532. But for now let's
at least make it fail gracefully and not crash.

GH: 1532

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1547)
(cherry picked from commit 92ed7fa5)

Never output -0; make "negative zero" an impossibility.
Do better checking on BN_rand top/bottom requirements and #bits.
Update doc.
Ignoring trailing garbage in BN_asc2bn.

Port this commit from boringSSL: https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/899b9b19a4cd3fe526aaf5047ab9234cdca19f7d%5E!/


        Ensure |BN_div| never gives negative zero in the no_branch code.

        Have |bn_correct_top| fix |bn->neg| if the input is zero so that we
        don't have negative zeros lying around.

        Thanks to Brian Smith for noticing.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 01c09f9f)
(Some manual work required)

crypto/bn/*: x86[_64] division instruction doesn't handle constants, change constraint from 'g' to 'r'.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68b4a6e9)

The function tls_construct_cert_status() is called by both TLS and DTLS
code. However it only ever constructed a TLS message header for the message
which obviously failed in DTLS.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

OPENSSL_cleanse() does not validate its input parameter for NULL so
SRP_create_verifier() should do so instead. Otherwise a segfault will
result.

Alternative solution to GitHub PR#1006

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The definition of STITCHED_CALL relies on OPENSSL_NO_ASM.  However,
when a configuration simply lacks the assembler implementation for RC4
(which is where we have implemented the stitched call), OPENSSL_NO_ASM
isn't implemented.  Better, then, to rely on specific macros that
indicated that RC4 (and MD5) are implemented in assembler.

For this to work properly, we must also make sure Configure adds the
definition of RC4_ASM among the C flags.

(partly cherry picked from commit 216e8d91

)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>