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  1. Mar 10, 2015
    • Matt Caswell's avatar
      Prevent handshake with unseeded PRNG · 2b31fcc0
      Matt Caswell authored
      
      
      Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
      handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
      - Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
      user has not seeded manually
      - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
      SSL_client_methodv23)
      - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
      from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
      (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)
      
      If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
      have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
      the output may be predictable.
      
      For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
      succeed on an unpatched platform:
      
      openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA
      
      CVE-2015-0285
      
      Reviewed-by: default avatarRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      (cherry picked from commit e1b568dd)
      2b31fcc0
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