- Nov 07, 2016
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Andrea Grandi authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1834 (cherry picked from commit 27ed73a9)
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David Benjamin authored
MD5/SHA1 and MDC-2 have special-case logic beyond the generic DigestInfo wrapping. Test that each of these works, including hash and length mismatches (both input and signature). Also add VerifyRecover tests. It appears 5824cc29 added support for VerifyRecover, but forgot to add the test data. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474 (cherry picked from commit f3205557)
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David Benjamin authored
PKCS #1 v2.0 is the name of a document which specifies an algorithm RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, often referred to as "PKCS #1 v1.5" after an earlier document which specified it. This gets further confusing because the document PKCS #1 v2.1 specifies two signature algorithms, RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 and RSASSA-PSS. RSA_sign implements RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5. Refer to the document using the RFC number which is easier to find anyway, and refer to the algorithm by its name. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474 (cherry picked from commit aa90ca11)
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David Benjamin authored
RFC 3447, section 8.2.2, steps 3 and 4 states that verifiers must encode the DigestInfo struct and then compare the result against the public key operation result. This implies that one and only one encoding is legal. OpenSSL instead parses with crypto/asn1, then checks that the encoding round-trips, and allows some variations for the parameter. Sufficient laxness in this area can allow signature forgeries, as described in https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/09/26/pkcs1.html Although there aren't known attacks against OpenSSL's current scheme, this change makes OpenSSL implement the algorithm as specified. This avoids the uncertainty and, more importantly, helps grow a healthy ecosystem. Laxness beyond the spec, particularly in implementations which enjoy wide use, risks harm to the ecosystem for all. A signature producer which only tests against OpenSSL may not notice bugs and accidentally become widely deployed. Thus implementations have a responsibility to honor the specification as tightly as is practical. In some cases, the damage is permanent and the spec deviation and security risk becomes a tax all implementors must forever pay, but not here. Both BoringSSL and Go successfully implemented and deployed RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 as specified since their respective beginnings, so this change should be compatible enough to pin down in future OpenSSL releases. See also https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-thomson-postel-was-wrong-00 As a bonus, by not having to deal with sign/verify differences, this version is also somewhat clearer. It also more consistently enforces digest lengths in the verify_recover codepath. The NID_md5_sha1 codepath wasn't quite doing this right. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1474 (cherry picked from commit 608a0264)
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Matt Caswell authored
This partially reverts commit c636c1c4 . It also tweaks the documentation and comments in this area. On the client side the documented interface for SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() is that setting the flag SSL_VERIFY_PEER causes verfication of the server certificate to take place. Previously what was implemented was that if *any* flag was set then verification would take place. The above commit improved the semantics to be as per the documented interface. However, we have had a report of at least one application where an application was incorrectly using the interface and used *only* SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT on the client side. In OpenSSL prior to the above commit this still caused verification of the server certificate to take place. After this commit the application silently failed to verify the server certificate. Ideally SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() could be modified to indicate if invalid flags were being used. However these are void functions! The simplest short term solution is to revert to the previous behaviour which at least means we "fail closed" rather than "fail open". Thanks to Cory Benfield for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c8e2f98c)
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Matt Caswell authored
We read it later in grow_init_buf(). If CCS is the first thing received in a flight, then it will use the init_msg from the last flight we received. If the init_buf has been grown in the meantime then it will point to some arbitrary other memory location. This is likely to result in grow_init_buf() attempting to grow to some excessively large amount which is likely to fail. In practice this should never happen because the only time we receive a CCS as the first thing in a flight is in an abbreviated handshake. None of the preceding messages from the server flight would be large enough to trigger this. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit c4377574)
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- Nov 06, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1772) (cherry picked from commit 475592e2)
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Richard Levitte authored
If zlib-dynamic was given but not --with-zlib-lib, LIBZ was defined to the empty string. Instead, give it the default "ZLIB1". Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1772) (cherry picked from commit 111b234c)
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Richard Levitte authored
VMS only unloads shared libraries at process rundown, so tell the OpenSSL code so by pretending we linked with -znodelete. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1862) (cherry picked from commit 1186a2b3)
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- Nov 04, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Since the local symbol table is looked up before the global symbol table, 'arch' assigned in the local symbol table of the DCL where MMS is called would be seen before the 'arch' defined in descrip.mms. Assigning it to the local symbol table in descrip.mms removes that issue. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1853) (cherry picked from commit 3ee24d4a)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1849) (cherry picked from commit 1e62cc12)
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Richard Levitte authored
Clang on Linux seems to catch things that we might miss otherwise. Also, throw in 'no-deprecated' to make sure we test that as well. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1839) (cherry picked from commit 7b195438)
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- Nov 03, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
test/shlibloadtest.c assumes all Unix style platforms use .so as shared library extension. This is not the case for Mac OS X, which uses .dylib. Instead of this, have the test recipe find out the extension from configuration data. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1844) (cherry picked from commit 62dd3351)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1842) (cherry picked from commit 00bb5504)
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Richard Levitte authored
Pre 1.1.0, 'make test' would set the environment variable OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY to "on". This got lost when translating the old build files to the new templates. This changes reintroduces that variable. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1840) (cherry picked from commit 6d4bc8a3)
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Richard Levitte authored
- Make sure to initialise SHLIB variables - Make sure to make local variables static Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1838) (cherry picked from commit 3b0478fe)
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Richard Levitte authored
gcc is kinder, it silently passes quite a few flags to ld, while clang is stricter and wants them prefixed with -Wl, Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1836) (cherry picked from commit 075e9da0)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1832) (cherry picked from commit 9c89c846)
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1828 (cherry picked from commit ea6199ea)
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Mike Aizatsky authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #1788 (cherry picked from commit ba740700)
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- Nov 02, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Rather than leaking a reference, just call GetModuleHandleEx and pin the module on Windows. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 2b59d1be)
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Matt Caswell authored
Instead of deliberately leaking a reference to ourselves, use nodelete which does this more neatly. Only for Linux at the moment. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b6d5ba1a)
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Matt Caswell authored
This should demonstrate that the atexit() handling is working properly (or at least not crashing) on process exit. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b987d748)
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Matt Caswell authored
Because we use atexit() to cleanup after ourselves, this will cause a problem if we have been dynamically loaded and then unloaded again: the atexit() handler may no longer be there. Most modern atexit() implementations can handle this, however there are still difficulties if libssl gets unloaded before libcrypto, because of the atexit() callback that libcrypto makes to libssl. The most robust solution seems to be to ensure that libcrypto and libssl never unload. This is done by simply deliberately leaking a dlopen() reference to them. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 5836780f)
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Matt Caswell authored
This works the same way as DSO_pathbyaddr() but instead returns a ptr to the DSO that contains the provided symbol. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b39eda7e)
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit 3d8b2ec4 removed various unused functions. However now we need to use one of them! This commit resurrects DSO_pathbyaddr(). We're not going to resurrect the Windows version though because what we need to achieve can be done a different way on Windows. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit cb6ea61c)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit ce95f3b7)
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Matt Caswell authored
We should fail if we receive an unrecognised record type Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 1f3e70a4)
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Matt Caswell authored
TLS1.0 and TLS1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We swap to the TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. Issue reported by 郭志攀 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 436a2a01)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1815) (cherry picked from commit 2c4a3f93)
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Sergey Bronnikov authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1801) (cherry picked from commit fe2582a2)
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Matt Caswell authored
This test checks that read_ahead works correctly when dealing with large records. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 7856332e)
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Matt Caswell authored
The function ssl3_read_n() takes a parameter |clearold| which, if set, causes any old data in the read buffer to be forgotten, and any unread data to be moved to the start of the buffer. This is supposed to happen when we first read the record header. However, the data move was only taking place if there was not already sufficient data in the buffer to satisfy the request. If read_ahead is set then the record header could be in the buffer already from when we read the preceding record. So with read_ahead we can get into a situation where even though |clearold| is set, the data does not get moved to the start of the read buffer when we read the record header. This means there is insufficient room in the read buffer to consume the rest of the record body, resulting in an internal error. This commit moves the |clearold| processing to earlier in ssl3_read_n() to ensure that it always takes place. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit a7faa6da)
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Richard Levitte authored
Forks will have to define their own Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1821) (cherry picked from commit 5e28b1c1)
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- Nov 01, 2016
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1625) (cherry picked from commit e4d94269)
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- Oct 31, 2016
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1802) (cherry picked from commit f46661de)
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #1781 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1813) (cherry picked from commit ebca7961)
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Richard Levitte authored
VC-noCE-common and VC-WIN64-common were missing this line: template => 1, Fixes GH#1809 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1811) (cherry picked from commit be1f4812)
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- Oct 28, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Replace the various length checks in the extension code with a macro to simplify the logic. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The previous commit inspired a review of all the length checks for the extension adding code. This adds more robust checks and adds checks where some were missing previously. The real solution for this is to use WPACKET which is currently in master - but that cannot be applied to release branches. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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