- Oct 05, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- Oct 04, 2006
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Nils Larsch authored
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- Sep 29, 2006
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Mark J. Cox authored
Steve Kiernan
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Richard Levitte authored
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- Sep 28, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
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Bodo Möller authored
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Richard Levitte authored
1) Certificate Message with no certs OpenSSL implementation sends the Certificate message during SSL handshake, however as per the specification, these have been omitted. -- RFC 2712 -- CertificateRequest, and the ServerKeyExchange shown in Figure 1 will be omitted since authentication and the establishment of a master secret will be done using the client's Kerberos credentials for the TLS server. The client's certificate will be omitted for the same reason. -- RFC 2712 -- 3) Pre-master secret Protocol version The pre-master secret generated by OpenSSL does not have the correct client version. RFC 2712 says, if the Kerberos option is selected, the pre-master secret structure is the same as that used in the RSA case. TLS specification defines pre-master secret as: struct { ProtocolVersion client_version; opaque random[46]; } PreMasterSecret; where client_version is the latest protocol version supported by the client The pre-master secret generated by OpenSSL does not have the correct client version. The implementation does not update the first 2 bytes of random secret for Kerberos Cipher suites. At the server-end, the client version from the pre-master secret is not validated. PR: 1336
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Mark J. Cox authored
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Mark J. Cox authored
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Mark J. Cox authored
cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team]
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- Sep 23, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- Sep 22, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR: 1377
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- Sep 18, 2006
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Andy Polyakov authored
PR: 1390
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Andy Polyakov authored
PR: 1382
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Bodo Möller authored
[Problem pointed out by Adam Young <adamy (at) acm.org>]
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- Sep 12, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
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- Sep 11, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
ciphersuite as well
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- Sep 06, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
Colin Percival (this would have caused more problems than solved, and isn't really necessary anyway)
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- Sep 05, 2006
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Mark J. Cox authored
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Mark J. Cox authored
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Mark J. Cox authored
(CVE-2006-4339) Submitted by: Ben Laurie, Google Security Team Reviewed by: bmoeller, mjc, shenson
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- Aug 31, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- Aug 28, 2006
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Ben Laurie authored
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- Aug 01, 2006
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Andy Polyakov authored
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- Jul 31, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
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- Jul 19, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
Submitted by: NTT
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Bodo Möller authored
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- Jul 13, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- Jul 09, 2006
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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- Jul 02, 2006
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Ben Laurie authored
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- Jun 30, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
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Bodo Möller authored
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- Jun 28, 2006
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Bodo Möller authored
large FD: it's non-blocking mode anyway
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Andy Polyakov authored
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Andy Polyakov authored
[from HEAD].
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- Jun 27, 2006
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Richard Levitte authored
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