Loading CHANGES +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [xx XXX xxxx] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] Loading Loading @@ -962,6 +965,9 @@ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [xx XXX xxxx] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. Loading NEWS +11 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b: o Cipher string fixes. Loading @@ -17,7 +22,7 @@ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CAN-2005-2969 o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8: Loading Loading @@ -94,6 +99,10 @@ o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. Loading @@ -105,7 +114,7 @@ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CAN-2005-2969 o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Loading crypto/rsa/rsa.h +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114 #define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130 Loading crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +9 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -640,6 +640,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is small. */ if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num); Loading crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"}, Loading Loading
CHANGES +6 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [xx XXX xxxx] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] Loading Loading @@ -962,6 +965,9 @@ Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [xx XXX xxxx] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. Loading
NEWS +11 −2 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -5,6 +5,11 @@ This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b: o Cipher string fixes. Loading @@ -17,7 +22,7 @@ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CAN-2005-2969 o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8: Loading Loading @@ -94,6 +99,10 @@ o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. Loading @@ -105,7 +114,7 @@ Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CAN-2005-2969 o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa.h +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -412,6 +412,7 @@ void ERR_load_RSA_strings(void); #define RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q 127 #define RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR 121 #define RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 114 #define RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT 105 #define RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME 128 #define RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME 129 #define RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED 130 Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c +9 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -640,6 +640,15 @@ static int RSA_eay_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, { case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to,num,buf,i,num); /* Generally signatures should be at least 2/3 padding, though this isn't possible for really short keys and some standard signature schemes, so don't check if the unpadded data is small. */ if(r > 42 && 3*8*r >= BN_num_bits(rsa->n)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT); goto err; } break; case RSA_X931_PADDING: r=RSA_padding_check_X931(to,num,buf,i,num); Loading
crypto/rsa/rsa_err.c +1 −0 Original line number Diff line number Diff line Loading @@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[]= {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q) ,"n does not equal p q"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR) ,"oaep decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED) ,"padding check failed"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS1_PADDING_TOO_SHORT),"pkcs1 padding too short"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME) ,"p not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME) ,"q not prime"}, {ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),"rsa operations not supported"}, Loading