The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c8269881)

Conflicts:
	ssl/record/ssl3_record.c

Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 873fb39f)

Fortify flagged up a problem in n_do_ssl_write() in SSLv2. Analysing the
code I do not believe there is a real problem here. However the logic flows
are complicated enough that a sanity check of |len| is probably worthwhile.

Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This reverts commit 47daa155

.

The above commit was backported to the 1.0.2 branch as part of backporting
the alternative chain verify algorithm changes. However it has been pointed
out (credit to Shigeki Ohtsu) that this is unnecessary in 1.0.2 as this
commit is a work around for loop checking that only exists in master.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6038354c)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a4d5269e)

Cosmetic, no real effect.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4446044a)

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting these issues.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 53dd4ddf)

Also add a few comments about constant-timeness.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The function CRYPTO_strdup (aka OPENSSL_strdup) fails to check the return
value from CRYPTO_malloc to see if it is NULL before attempting to use it.
This patch adds a NULL check.

RT3786

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37b0cf936744d9edb99b5dd82cae78a7eac6ad60)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 20d21389c8b6f5b754573ffb6a4dc4f3986f2ca4)

EAP-FAST session resumption relies on handshake message lookahead
to determine server intentions. Commits
980bc1ec
and
7b3ba508


removed the lookahead so broke session resumption.

This change partially reverts the commits and brings the lookahead back
in reduced capacity for TLS + EAP-FAST only. Since EAP-FAST does not
support regular session tickets, the lookahead now only checks for a
Finished message.

Regular handshakes are unaffected by this change.

Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 6e3d0153)

newsig may be used (freed) uninitialized on a malloc error.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 68249414)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The logic with how 'ok' was calculated didn't quite convey what's "ok",
so the logic is slightly redone to make it less confusing.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 06affe3d)

Filled in lots of return value checks that were missing the GOST engine, and
added appropriate error handling.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8817e2e0)

Fix miscellaneous NULL pointer derefs in the sureware engine.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7b611e5f)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7be6bc68)

This addresses

- request for improvement for faster key setup in RT#3576;
- clearing registers and stack in RT#3554 (this is more of a gesture to
see if there will be some traction from compiler side);
- more commentary around input parameters handling and stack layout
(desired when RT#3553 was reviewed);
- minor size and single block performance optimization (was lying around);

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 23f6eec7)

Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.

Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e5991ec5

)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

the X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag.

Conflicts:
	doc/apps/cms.pod
	doc/apps/ocsp.pod
	doc/apps/s_client.pod
	doc/apps/s_server.pod
	doc/apps/smime.pod
	doc/apps/verify.pod

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS flag. Using this option means that when building
certificate chains, the first chain found will be the one used. Without this
flag, if the first chain found is not trusted then we will keep looking to
see if we can build an alternative chain instead.

Conflicts:
	apps/cms.c
	apps/ocsp.c
	apps/s_client.c
	apps/s_server.c
	apps/smime.c
	apps/verify.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

behaviour will force behaviour as per previous versions of OpenSSL

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

valid. However the issuer of the leaf, or some intermediate cert is in fact
in the trust store.

When building a trust chain if the first attempt fails, then try to see if
alternate chains could be constructed that are trusted.

RT3637
RT3621

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Fix bug where i2c_ASN1_INTEGER mishandles zero if it is marked as
negative.

Thanks to Huzaifa Sidhpurwala <huzaifas@redhat.com> and
Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de> for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a0eed48d)

A 0-length ciphers list is never permitted. The old code only used to
reject an empty ciphers list for connections with a session ID. It
would later error out on a NULL structure, so this change just moves
the alert closer to the problem source.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3ae91cfb)

The disabled set of -Weverything is hard to maintain across versions.
Use -Wall -Wextra but also document other useful warnings that currently trigger.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <gitlab@openssl.org>

Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>
PR#3800

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c4137b5e)

Reported by Hanno Böck <hanno@hboeck.de>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 111b60be)

If OpenSSL is configured with no-tlsext then ssl_get_prev_session can read
past the end of the ClientHello message if the session_id length in the
ClientHello is invalid. This should not cause any security issues since the
underlying buffer is 16k in size. It should never be possible to overrun by
that many bytes.

This is probably made redundant by the previous commit - but you can never be
too careful.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5e0a80c1)

The ClientHello processing is insufficiently rigorous in its checks to make
sure that we don't read past the end of the message. This does not have
security implications due to the size of the underlying buffer - but still
needs to be fixed.

With thanks to Qinghao Tang for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit c9642eb1ff79a30e2c7632ef8267cc34cc2b0d79)

It would set gen->d.dirn to a freed pointer in case X509V3_NAME_from_section
failed.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ec5c5dd)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <openssl-users@dukhovni.org>
(cherry picked from commit f49baeff)

While *pval is usually a pointer in rare circumstances it can be a long
value. One some platforms (e.g. WIN64) where
sizeof(long) < sizeof(ASN1_VALUE *) this will write past the field.

*pval is initialised correctly in the rest of ASN1_item_ex_new so setting it
to NULL is unecessary anyway.

Thanks to Julien Kauffmann for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f617b496)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/tasn_new.c

PR#3789

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a317fa0)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9fdbc9df)

Since source reformat, we ended up with some error reason string
definitions that spanned two lines.  That in itself is fine, but we
sometimes edited them to provide better strings than what could be
automatically determined from the reason macro, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "Peer haven't sent GOST certificate, required for selected ciphersuite"},

However, mkerr.pl didn't treat those two-line definitions right, and
they ended up being retranslated to whatever the macro name would
indicate, for example:

    {ERR_REASON(SSL_R_NO_GOST_CERTIFICATE_SENT_BY_PEER),
     "No gost certificate sent by peer"},

Clearly not what we wanted.  This change fixes this problem.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2cfdfe09)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 37d92b1b)

The macros BSWAP4 and BSWAP8 have statetemnt expressions
implementations that use local variable names that shadow variables
outside the macro call, generating warnings like this

e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:263:14: warning: declaration shadows a local variable
      [-Wshadow]
    seqnum = BSWAP8(blocks[0].q[0]);
             ^
../modes/modes_lcl.h:41:29: note: expanded from macro 'BSWAP8'
                            ^
e_aes_cbc_hmac_sha1.c:223:12: note: previous declaration is here
    size_t ret = 0;
           ^

Have clang be quiet by modifying the macro variable names slightly
(suffixing them with an underscore).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2da2a434)