- Mar 08, 2017
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Roberto Guimaraes authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2750) (cherry picked from commit 6aad9393)
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- Mar 07, 2017
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2866) (cherry picked from commit c1f84df2)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Exteneded feature flags were not pulled on AMD processors, as result a number of extensions were effectively masked on Ryzen. It should have been reported for Excavator since it implements AVX2 extension, but apparently nobody noticed or cared... Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f8418d87)
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- Mar 03, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2834)
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Pauli authored
explicitly state that the RSA cipher string means the same a kRSA. Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2821) (cherry picked from commit f2bcff43)
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- Feb 28, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2755) (cherry picked from commit 6faa3456)
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- Feb 27, 2017
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Adrian Vollmer authored
...in the man page to reflect the actual default (2048 instead of 512) CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2754) (cherry picked from commit 013bc448)
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- Feb 24, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2595)
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- Feb 23, 2017
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2721) (cherry picked from commit 8fce04ee)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Travis OS X utilization and backlog statistics suggest that it became bottleneck for our integration builds with requests piling up for days during working days of the week. Suggestion is to remove osx till capacity is lesser issue. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e12e903e)
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Todd Short authored
If ret is allocated, it may be leaked on error. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2666) (cherry picked from commit 4483e234)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2714)
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Andy Polyakov authored
pointers, except for minimal std[in|out|err]. (cherry picked from commit 800b299b ) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2701)
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2713)
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- Feb 22, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2689) (cherry picked from commit 50799f35)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2707) (cherry picked from commit 6eb83758)
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Rich Salz authored
Prevent that memory beyond the last element is accessed if every element of group->poly[] is non-zero Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2689) (cherry picked from commit 57f48f93)
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Richard Levitte authored
opendir(), readdir() and closedir() have been available on VMS since version 7.0. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2707) (cherry picked from commit d8eaaf15)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2704) (cherry picked from commit 79020b27)
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- Feb 21, 2017
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Dmitry Belyavskiy authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2676) (cherry picked from commit 1b8f1937)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2685)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2685)
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Rich Salz authored
Change size comparison from > (GT) to >= (GTE) to ensure an additional byte of output buffer, to prevent OOB reads/writes later in the function Reject input strings larger than 2GB Detect invalid output buffer size and return early Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2672) (cherry picked from commit ecca1663)
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- Feb 17, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2640) (cherry picked from commit aa402e2b)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2641)
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- Feb 16, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #2220 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2645)
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- Feb 15, 2017
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2554)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2639)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2625)
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- Feb 14, 2017
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2571) (cherry picked from commit 7e12cdb5)
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Guido Vranken authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1613) (cherry picked from commit 7c120357)
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Yuchi authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2559) (cherry picked from commit e0670973)
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- Feb 13, 2017
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Darren Tucker authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2604) (cherry picked from commit ca423a69)
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David Benjamin authored
While it's always safe to read |SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH| bytes from an |SSL_SESSION|'s |session_id| array, the hash function would do so with without considering if all those bytes had been written to. This change checks |session_id_length| before possibly reading uninitialised memory. Since the result of the hash function was already attacker controlled, and since a lookup of a short session ID will always fail, it doesn't appear that this is anything more than a clean up. In particular, |ssl_get_prev_session| uses a stack-allocated placeholder |SSL_SESSION| as a lookup key, so the |session_id| array may be uninitialised. This was originally found with libFuzzer and MSan in https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/e976e4349d693b4bbb97e1694f45be5a1b22c8c7, then by Robert Swiecki with honggfuzz and MSan here. Thanks to both. (cherry picked from commit bd5d27c1 ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2583)
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- Feb 09, 2017
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Matt Hauck authored
This only manifested itself with FIPS enabled statically linked engines. The OPENSSL_init call ended up invoking RAND_init_fips for a FIPS enabled build, which called CRYPTO_malloc, resulting in disallowing the engine to finish its IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN call. (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)Reviewed-by : Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> CLA: trivial (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1308)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- enable ssl3_init_finished_mac to return an error - don't continue the SSL state machine if that happens in ssl3_connect: - if ssl3_setup_buffer fails also set state to SSL_ST_ERR for consistency Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2130)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
- add error handling in ssl3_generate_key_block and ssl3_change_cipher_state Fixes #2114 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2137)
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- Feb 08, 2017
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Todd Short authored
When session tickets are used, it's possible that SNI might swtich the SSL_CTX on an SSL. Normally, this is not a problem, because the initial_ctx/session_ctx are used for all session ticket/id processes. However, when the SNI callback occurs, it's possible that the callback may update the options in the SSL from the SSL_CTX, and this could cause SSL_OP_NO_TICKET to be set. If this occurs, then two bad things can happen: 1. The session ticket TLSEXT may not be written when the ticket expected flag is set. The state machine transistions to writing the ticket, and the client responds with an error as its not expecting a ticket. 2. When creating the session ticket, if the ticket key cb returns 0 the crypto/hmac contexts are not initialized, and the code crashes when trying to encrypt the session ticket. To fix 1, if the ticket TLSEXT is not written out, clear the expected ticket flag. To fix 2, consider a return of 0 from the ticket key cb a recoverable error, and write a 0 length ticket and continue. The client-side code can explicitly handle this case. Fix these two cases, and add unit test code to validate ticket behavior. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1065)
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- Feb 07, 2017
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks to Graeme Perrow for reporting and providing a possible fix. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2565)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2567)
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