- 17 Feb, 2017 24 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2667)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Fix an error code clash due to a merge Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2665)
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Richard Levitte authored
Don't run this test unless 'openssl rehash' works properly. Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
We use an int instead. That means SSL_key_update() also should use an int. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
This also adds documentation for the pre-existing and related SSL_renegotiate*() functions. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Too many KeyUpdate message could be inicative of a problem (e.g. an infinite KeyUpdate loop if the peer always responds to a KeyUpdate message with an "update_requested" KeyUpdate response), or (conceivably) an attack. Either way we limit the number of KeyUpdate messages we are prepared to handle. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
This just receives the message. It doesn't actually update any keys yet. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
This implements the server side KeyUpdate sending capability as well. Reviewed-by:
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David Benjamin authored
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Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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- 16 Feb, 2017 16 commits
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Richard Levitte authored
Fortunately, "openssl verify" makes good use of that API Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
For client auth call tls_choose_sigalg to select the certificate and signature algorithm. Use the selected algorithm in tls_construct_cert_verify. Remove obsolete tls12_get_sigandhash. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Select appropriate signature algorithm and certificate for client authentication using tls_choose_sigalg. A lot of selection logic is very similar except not finding a certificate is not a fatal error: we just do not present a certificate. For TLS 1.2 and earlier we only check the current certificate is suitable (for compatibility with previous logic) for TLS 1.3 (where there are no compatibility issues) we support multiple client certificates for different algorithms. Reviewed-by:
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lrns authored
Change req_check_len error message, it also accepts 20 bytes, but states 'less than' in the error message Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Benjamin Kaduk authored
The intent seems to be that the WIN32 symbol is for things that are a direct byproduct of being a windows-variant configuration and should be used for feature en/disablement on windows systems. Use of the _WIN32 symbol is more widespread, being used to implement platform portability of more generic code. We do define WIN32 in some situations in e_os.h, but that is not included universally. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Following on from CVE-2017-3733, this removes the OPENSSL_assert() check that failed and replaces it with a soft assert, and an explicit check of value with an error return if it fails. Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS (instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code. The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore, during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur. Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not. CVE-2017-3733 Reviewed-by: -
Matt Caswell authored
In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS (instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code. This commit provides a test for the issue. CVE-2017-3733 Reviewed-by: -
Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Robert Scheck authored
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Kazuki Yamaguchi authored
Fix a typo. Probably this has not been found because EVP_CIPHER_CTX is smaller than EVP_CHACHA_AEAD_CTX and heap overflow does not occur. Reviewed-by:
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