- Aug 04, 2015
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Matt Caswell authored
Use the PACKET API for processing ClientCertificate messages Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Some of the PACKET functions were returning incorrect data. An unfortunate choice of test data in the unit test was masking the failure. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Aug 03, 2015
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Matt Caswell authored
EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates was using some variables that only apply if OPENSSL_NO_EC2M is not defined. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The move of CCS into the state machine was causing make errors to fail. This fixes it. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The move of CCS into the state machine introduced a bug in ssl3_read_bytes. The value of |recvd_type| was not being set if we are satisfying the request from handshake fragment storage. This can occur, for example, with renegotiation and causes the handshake to fail. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages. Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake. Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS. Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not visible to the state machine. Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine. This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit will handle DTLS. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Uses the new PACKET code to process the incoming ClientHello including all extensions etc. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Add some unit tests for the new PACKET API Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Provide more robust (inline) functions to replace n2s, n2l, etc. These functions do the same thing as the previous macros, but also keep track of the amount of data remaining and return an error if we try to read more data than we've got. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Aug 02, 2015
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Aug 01, 2015
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte
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Dirk Wetter authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Jul 31, 2015
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Ben Laurie authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit e481f9b9 removed OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT from the code. Previously if OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT *was not* defined then the server random was filled during getting of the ClientHello. If it *was* defined then the server random would be filled in ssl3_send_server_hello(). Unfortunately in commit e481f9b9 the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT guards were removed but *both* server random fillings were left in. This could cause problems for session ticket callbacks. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Loganaden Velvindron authored
From a CloudFlare patch. Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Thanks folks: 348 Benjamin Kaduk 317 Christian Brueffer 254 Erik Tews 253 Erik Tews 219 Carl Mehner 155 (ghost) 95 mancha 51 DominikNeubauer Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Kai Engert authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Adam Eijdenberg authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Adam Eijdenberg authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Adam Eijdenberg authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Nicholas Cooper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- Jul 30, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Note: some of the RFC4279 ciphersuites were originally part of PR#2464. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Move PSK premaster secret algorithm to ssl_generate_master secret so existing key exchange code can be used and modified slightly to add the PSK wrapping structure. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK server side. Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages are only sent when required. Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now include an identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK client key exchange message expects PSK identity and requests key for all PSK key exchange ciphersuites. Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add support for RSAPSK, DHEPSK and ECDHEPSK client side. Update various checks to ensure certificate and server key exchange messages are only expected when required. Update message handling. PSK server key exchange parsing now expects an identity hint prefix for all PSK server key exchange messages. PSK client key exchange message requests PSK identity and key for all PSK key exchange ciphersuites and includes identity in message. Update flags for RSA, DH and ECDH so they are also used in PSK. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
For SHA384 PRF PSK ciphersuites we have to switch to default PRF for TLS < 1.2 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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