This patch was submitted by user "Kox" via the wiki

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2dd8cb3b)

Limit the number of empty records that will be processed consecutively
in order to prevent ssl3_get_record from never returning.

Reported by "oftc_must_be_destroyed" and George Kadianakis.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3aac17a8)

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e19c9381)

Clarify the intended use of EVP_PKEY_sign. Make the code example compile.

Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d64c533a)

In Visual Studio, inline is available in C++ only, however __inline is available for C, see
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx



Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f511b25a)

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit da92be4d)

eliminating them as dead code.

Both volatile and "memory" are used because of some concern that the compiler
may still cache values across the asm block without it, and because this was
such a painful debugging session that I wanted to ensure that it's never
repeated.

(cherry picked from commit 7753a3a6

)

Conflicts:
	crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

PR#3450

Conflicts:
	ssl/s3_clnt.c

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

group_order_tests (ectest.c).  Also fix the EC_POINTs_mul documentation (ec.h).

Reviewed-by:  <emilia@openssl.org>

Add patch missed from backport of SRP ciphersuite fix.
PR#3490
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

The addition of SRP authentication needs to be checked in various places
to work properly. Specifically:

A certificate is not sent.
A certificate request must not be sent.
Server key exchange message must not contain a signature.
If appropriate SRP authentication ciphersuites should be chosen.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8f5a8805b82d1ae81168b11b7f1506db9e047dec)

Conflicts:

	ssl/s3_clnt.c
	ssl/s3_lib.c

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 193c1c07165b0042abd217274a084b49459d4443)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Check SRP parameters when they are received so we can send back an
appropriate alert.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal
buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code.

Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
Group for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

If a client attempted to use an SRP ciphersuite and it had not been
set up correctly it would crash with a null pointer read. A malicious
server could exploit this in a DoS attack.

Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki from Codenomicon
for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-5139
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3509
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

- Upon parsing, reject OIDs with invalid base-128 encoding.
- Always NUL-terminate the destination buffer in OBJ_obj2txt printing function.

CVE-2014-3508

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3510

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

CVE-2014-3511

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

In a couple of functions, a sequence number would be calculated twice.

Additionally, in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|, we know that
|frag_len| <= |msg_hdr->msg_len| so the later tests for |frag_len <
msg_hdr->msg_len| can be more clearly written as |frag_len !=
msg_hdr->msg_len|, since that's the only remaining case.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Applying same fix as in dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message. A truncated DTLS fragment would cause *ok to be clear, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read.

Problem identified by Emilia Käsper, based on previous issue/patch by Adam
Langley.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in
|dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but
the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would
cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would
continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that
*ok was zero.

I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses
|s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can
see.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a
duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of
sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call
|dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would
then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the
return value, leaking the fragment.

This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer.

Fixes CVE-2014-3507

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of
|msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum
handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the
fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the
allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB
(for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages
are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS
connection.

In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no
check was applied.

Fixes CVE-2014-3506

Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a
|pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed
in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the
error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double
freed.

Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74

 was
inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct).

Fixes CVE-2014-3505

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

We can't rename ssleay_rand_bytes to md_rand_bytes_lock as this will cause
an error code discrepancy. Instead keep ssleay_rand_bytes and add an
extra parameter: since ssleay_rand_bytes is not part of the public API
this wont cause any binary compatibility issues.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org >
(cherry picked from commit 8068a675a7d1a657c54546f24e673e59e6707f03)

(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly).

Reviewed-by:  <emilia@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	CHANGES

Don't use multiple locks when SP800-90 DRBG is used outside FIPS mode.

PR#3176
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3efe1b6)

Don't call internal functions directly call them through
SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on
Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions
from shared libraries.

By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile
time option "enable-unit-test".
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e0fc7961)

Conflicts:

	ssl/Makefile
	util/mkdef.pl

PR#2569

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cba11f57)

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 62352b81)