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|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
|| !construct_ca_names(s, pkt)
|| !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_AUTHORITIES,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int tls_parse_certificate_authorities(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt,
unsigned int context, X509 *x,
size_t chainidx, int *al)
{
if (!parse_ca_names(s, pkt, al))
return 0;
if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
*al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
static int init_srtp(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
if (s->server)
s->srtp_profile = NULL;
return 1;
}
#endif
static int final_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
if (!sent && SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
*al = TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_SIG_ALGS, SSL_R_MISSING_SIGALGS_EXTENSION);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int final_key_share(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
return 1;
/*
* If
* we are a client
* AND
* we have no key_share
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes)
* THEN
if (!s->server
&& !sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0)) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
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/*
* If
* we are a server
* AND
* we have no key_share
* THEN
* If
* we didn't already send a HelloRetryRequest
* AND
* the client sent a key_share extension
* AND
* (we are not resuming
* OR the kex_mode allows key_share resumes)
* AND
* a shared group exists
* THEN
* send a HelloRetryRequest
* ELSE If
* we are not resuming
* OR
* the kex_mode doesn't allow non key_share resumes
* THEN
* fail;
*/
if (s->server && s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) {
/* No suitable share */
if (s->hello_retry_request == 0 && sent
&& (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE)
!= 0)) {
const unsigned char *pcurves, *pcurvestmp, *clntcurves;
size_t num_curves, clnt_num_curves, i;
/* Check if a shared group exists */
/* Get the clients list of supported groups. */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 1, &clntcurves, &clnt_num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Get our list of available groups */
if (!tls1_get_curvelist(s, 0, &pcurves, &num_curves)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Find the first group we allow that is also in client's list */
for (i = 0, pcurvestmp = pcurves; i < num_curves;
i++, pcurvestmp += 2) {
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if (check_in_list(s, group_id, clntcurves, clnt_num_curves, 1))
break;
}
if (i < num_curves) {
/* A shared group exists so send a HelloRetryRequest */
s->s3->group_id = group_id;
s->hello_retry_request = 1;
return 1;
}
}
if (!s->hit
|| (s->ext.psk_kex_mode & TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE) == 0) {
/* Nothing left we can do - just fail */
*al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
return 0;
}
}
/* We have a key_share so don't send any more HelloRetryRequest messages */
if (s->server)
s->hello_retry_request = 0;
/*
* For a client side resumption with no key_share we need to generate
* the handshake secret (otherwise this is done during key_share
* processing).
*/
if (!sent && !s->server && !tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, NULL, 0)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_FINAL_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int init_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, unsigned int context)
{
s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE;
return 1;
}
int tls_psk_do_binder(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *msgstart,
size_t binderoffset, const unsigned char *binderin,
unsigned char *binderout,
SSL_SESSION *sess, int sign)
{
EVP_PKEY *mackey = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], binderkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char finishedkey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], tmpbinder[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
const char resumption_label[] = "resumption psk binder key";
size_t bindersize, hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md);
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int ret = -1;
/* Generate the early_secret */
if (!tls13_generate_secret(s, md, NULL, sess->master_key,
sess->master_key_length,
(unsigned char *)&s->early_secret)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Create the handshake hash for the binder key...the messages so far are
* empty!
*/
mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the binder key */
if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_secret,
(unsigned char *)resumption_label,
sizeof(resumption_label) - 1, hash, binderkey,
hashsize)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/* Generate the finished key */
if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, binderkey, finishedkey, hashsize)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
* Get a hash of the ClientHello up to the start of the binders. If we are
* following a HelloRetryRequest then this includes the hash of the first
* ClientHello and the HelloRetryRequest itself.
if (s->hello_retry_request) {
size_t hdatalen;
void *hdata;
hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata);
if (hdatalen <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
/*
* For servers the handshake buffer data will include the second
* ClientHello - which we don't want - so we need to take that bit off.
*/
if (s->server) {
PACKET hashprefix, msg;
/* Find how many bytes are left after the first two messages */
if (!PACKET_buf_init(&hashprefix, hdata, hdatalen)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)
|| !PACKET_forward(&hashprefix, 1)
|| !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_3(&hashprefix, &msg)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
}
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(mctx, msgstart, binderoffset) <= 0
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|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
mackey = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, finishedkey, hashsize);
if (mackey == NULL) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!sign)
binderout = tmpbinder;
bindersize = hashsize;
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, NULL, md, NULL, mackey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hash, hashsize) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, binderout, &bindersize) <= 0
|| bindersize != hashsize) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PSK_DO_BINDER, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (sign) {
ret = 1;
} else {
/* HMAC keys can't do EVP_DigestVerify* - use CRYPTO_memcmp instead */
ret = (CRYPTO_memcmp(binderin, binderout, hashsize) == 0);
}
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(binderkey, sizeof(binderkey));
OPENSSL_cleanse(finishedkey, sizeof(finishedkey));
EVP_PKEY_free(mackey);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return ret;
}
static int final_early_data(SSL *s, unsigned int context, int sent, int *al)
{
if (!s->server || !sent)
return 1;
if (s->max_early_data == 0
|| !s->hit
|| s->session->ext.tick_identity != 0
|| s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING
|| !s->ext.early_data_ok
|| s->hello_retry_request
|| s->s3->alpn_selected_len != s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len
|| (s->s3->alpn_selected_len > 0
&& memcmp(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->session->ext.alpn_selected,
s->s3->alpn_selected_len) != 0)) {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
} else {
s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
if (!tls13_change_cipher_state(s,
SSL3_CC_EARLY | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) {
*al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}