- Feb 22, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
Prior to this commit we were keeping a count of how many KeyUpdates we have processed and failing if we had had too many. This simplistic approach is not sufficient for long running connections. Since many KeyUpdates would not be a particular good DoS route anyway, the simplest solution is to simply remove the key update count. Fixes #8068 Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8299) (cherry picked from commit 3409a5ff8a44ddaf043d83ed22e657ae871be289)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Fixes #7950 It was reported that there might be a null pointer dereference in the implementation of the dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() cipher, because EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() can return a null pointer if AES-NI is not available. It took some analysis to find out that this is not an issue in practice, and these comments explain the reason to comfort further NPD hunters. Detected by GitHub user @wurongxin1987 using the Sourcebrella Pinpoint static analyzer. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8305) (cherry picked from commit a4a0a1eb43cfccd128d085932a567e0482fbfe47)
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Paul Yang authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8303) (cherry picked from commit 84712024)
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- Feb 21, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
The aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1 cipher in the dasync engine is broken. Probably by commit e38c2e85 which removed use of the "enc" variable...but not completely. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8291) (cherry picked from commit 695dd3a332fdd54b873fd0d08f9ae720141f24cd)
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Hubert Kario authored
The option is a flag for Options, not a standalone setting. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8292) (cherry picked from commit 4ac5e43d)
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- Feb 20, 2019
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Nicola Tuveri authored
(cherry picked from commit c8147d37 ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253)
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Nicola Tuveri authored
This commit adds a simple unit test to make sure that the constant-time flag does not "leak" among BN_CTX frames: - test_ctx_consttime_flag() initializes (and later frees before returning) a BN_CTX object, then it calls in sequence test_ctx_set_ct_flag() and test_ctx_check_ct_flag() using the same BN_CTX object. The process is run twice, once with a "normal" BN_CTX_new() object, then with a BN_CTX_secure_new() one. - test_ctx_set_ct_flag() starts a frame in the given BN_CTX and sets the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag on some of the BIGNUMs obtained from the frame before ending it. - test_ctx_check_ct_flag() then starts a new frame and gets a number of BIGNUMs from it. In absence of leaks, none of the BIGNUMs in the new frame should have BN_FLG_CONSTTIME set. In actual BN_CTX usage inside libcrypto the leak could happen at any depth level in the BN_CTX stack, with varying results depending on the patterns of sibling trees of nested function calls sharing the same BN_CTX object, and the effect of unintended BN_FLG_CONSTTIME on the called BN_* functions. This simple unit test abstracts away this complexity and verifies that the leak does not happen between two sibling functions sharing the same BN_CTX object at the same level of nesting. (cherry picked from commit fe16ae5f ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8253)
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Billy Brumley authored
(cherry picked from commit 8f58ede0 ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)
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Billy Brumley authored
This commit adds a dedicated function in `EC_METHOD` to access a modular field inversion implementation suitable for the specifics of the implemented curve, featuring SCA countermeasures. The new pointer is defined as: `int (*field_inv)(const EC_GROUP*, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX*)` and computes the multiplicative inverse of `a` in the underlying field, storing the result in `r`. Three implementations are included, each including specific SCA countermeasures: - `ec_GFp_simple_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through blinding. - `ec_GFp_mont_field_inv()`, featuring SCA hardening through Fermat's Little Theorem (FLT) inversion. - `ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv()`, that uses `BN_GF2m_mod_inv()` which already features SCA hardening through blinding. From a security point of view, this also helps addressing a leakage previously affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. This commit also adds a new error reason code (i.e., `EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT`) to improve consistency between the three implementations as all of them could fail for the same reason but through different code paths resulting in inconsistent error stack states. Co-authored-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (cherry picked from commit e0033efc ) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8262)
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- Feb 19, 2019
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Ionut Mihalcea authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8175) (cherry picked from commit 8e981051)
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Matthias Kraft authored
The AIX binder needs to be instructed that the output will have no entry point (see AIX' ld manual: -e in the Flags section; autoexp and noentry in the Binder section). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8282) (cherry picked from commit c1b38462)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8191) (cherry picked from commit 73e62d40)
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Matt Caswell authored
In TLSv1.3 it is illegal to interleave handshake records with non handshake records. Fixes #8189 Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8191) (cherry picked from commit 3d35e3a253a2895f263333bb4355760630a31955)
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- Feb 18, 2019
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Corinna Vinschen authored
Cygwin binaries should not enforce text mode these days, just use text mode if the underlying mount point requests it Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8248) (cherry picked from commit 9b57e4a1)
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- Feb 17, 2019
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Vedran Miletić authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #8142 (cherry picked from commit e3ac3654892246d7492f1012897e42ad7efd13ce)
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Jan Macku authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> GH: #8121 (cherry picked from commit 70680262329004c934497040bfc6940072043f48)
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David Benjamin authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> GH: #8109 (cherry picked from commit e09633107b7e987b2179850715ba60d8fb069278)
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David Benjamin authored
The add/double shortcut in ecp_nistz256-x86_64.pl left one instruction point that did not unwind, and the "slow" path in AES_cbc_encrypt was not annotated correctly. For the latter, add .cfi_{remember,restore}_state support to perlasm. Next, fill in a bunch of functions that are missing no-op .cfi_startproc and .cfi_endproc blocks. libunwind cannot unwind those stack frames otherwise. Finally, work around a bug in libunwind by not encoding rflags. (rflags isn't a callee-saved register, so there's not much need to annotate it anyway.) These were found as part of ABI testing work in BoringSSL. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> GH: #8109 (cherry picked from commit c0e8e500)
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- Feb 15, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
safestack.h, lhash.h and sparse_array.h all define macros to generate a full API for the containers as static inline functions. This potentially generates unused code, which some compilers may complain about. We therefore need to mark those generated functions as unused, so the compiler knows that we know, and stops complaining about it. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8246) (cherry picked from commit 48fe4ce1)
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Matt Caswell authored
Otherwise this can result in an incorrect calculation of the maximum encoded integer length, meaning an insufficient buffer size is allocated. Thanks to Billy Brumley for helping to track this down. Fixes #8209 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8237) (cherry picked from commit 9fc8f18f)
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- Feb 14, 2019
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Matt Caswell authored
The "verify_return_error" option in s_client is documented as: Return verification errors instead of continuing. This will typically abort the handshake with a fatal error. In practice this option was ignored unless also accompanied with the "-verify" option. It's unclear what the original intention was. One fix could have been to change the documentation to match the actual behaviour. However it seems unecessarily complex and unexpected that you should need to have both options. Instead the fix implemented here is make the option match the documentation so that "-verify" is not also required. Note that s_server has a similar option where "-verify" (or "-Verify") is still required. This makes more sense because those options additionally request a certificate from the client. Without a certificate there is no possibility of a verification failing, and so "-verify_return_error" doing nothing seems ok. Fixes #8079 Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8080) (cherry picked from commit 78021171dbcb05ddab1b5daffbfc62504ea709a4)
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Matt Caswell authored
The original 1.1.1 design was to use SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal start/end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. Unfortunately experience has shown that this confuses some applications who mistake it for a TLSv1.2 renegotiation. This means that KeyUpdate messages are not handled properly. This commit removes the use of SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE to signal the start/end of a post-handshake message exchange. Individual post-handshake messages are still signalled in the normal way. This is a potentially breaking change if there are any applications already written that expect to see these TLSv1.3 events. However, without it, KeyUpdate is not currently usable for many applications. Fixes #8069 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8096) (cherry picked from commit 4af5836b)
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Sam Roberts authored
set_cipher_list() sets TLSv1.2 (and below) ciphers, and its success or failure should not depend on whether set_ciphersuites() has been used to setup TLSv1.3 ciphers. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7759) (cherry picked from commit 3c83c5ba4f6502c708b7a5f55c98a10e312668da)
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Richard Levitte authored
There are times when one might want to use something like DEFINE_STACK_OF in a .c file, because it defines a stack for a type defined in that .c file. Unfortunately, when configuring with `--strict-warnings`, clang aggressively warn about unused functions in such cases, which forces the use of such DEFINE macros to header files. We therefore disable this warning from the `--strict-warnings` definition for clang. (note for the curious: `-Wunused-function` is enabled via `-Wall`) Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8234) (cherry picked from commit f11ffa505f8a9345145a26a05bf77b012b6941bd)
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- Feb 13, 2019
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Michael Haubenwallner authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8226) (cherry picked from commit fa63e452)
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Daniel DeFreez authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8137) (cherry picked from commit b754a8a1)
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Andy Polyakov authored
ARMv8.3 adds pointer authentication extension, which in this case allows to ensure that, when offloaded to stack, return address is same at return as at entry to the subroutine. The new instructions are nops on processors that don't implement the extension, so that the vetification is backward compatible. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8205) (cherry picked from commit 9a18aae5)
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- Feb 11, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
This allows the user to override our defaults if needed, and in a consistent manner. Partial fix for #7607 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7624) (cherry picked from commit ca811248)
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Richard Levitte authored
Fixes #8091 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8094)
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Tomas Mraz authored
If the old openssl versions not supporting the .include directive load a config file with it, they will bail out with error. This change allows using the .include = <filename> syntax which is interpreted as variable assignment by the old openssl config file parser. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8141) (cherry picked from commit 9d556033)
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- Feb 10, 2019
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Daniel DeFreez authored
CLA: Trivial Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8183) (cherry picked from commit 758229f7d22775d7547e3b3b886b7f6a289c6897)
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- Feb 08, 2019
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Todd Short authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8168) (cherry picked from commit 1980ce45d6bdd2b57df7003d6b56b5df560b9064)
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Todd Short authored
o2i_ECPublicKey() requires an EC_KEY structure filled with an EC_GROUP. o2i_ECPublicKey() is called by d2i_PublicKey(). In order to fulfill the o2i_ECPublicKey()'s requirement, d2i_PublicKey() needs to be called with an EVP_PKEY with an EC_KEY containing an EC_GROUP. However, the call to EVP_PKEY_set_type() frees any existing key structure inside the EVP_PKEY, thus freeing the EC_KEY with the EC_GROUP that o2i_ECPublicKey() needs. This means you can't d2i_PublicKey() for an EC key... The fix is to check to see if the type is already set appropriately, and if so, not call EVP_PKEY_set_type(). Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8168) (cherry picked from commit 2aa2beb06cc25c1f8accdc3d87b946205becfd86)
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Pauli authored
reinstantiating the DRBG. Bug reported by Doug Gibbons. Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8184) (cherry picked from commit b1522fa5)
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- Feb 07, 2019
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Richard Levitte authored
The manual says this in its notes: ... and therefore applications using static linking should also call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread. ... Fixes #8171 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8173) (cherry picked from commit 03cdfe1efaf2a3b5192b8cb3ef331939af7bfeb8)
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Matt Caswell authored
Making this a no-op removes a potential infinite loop than can occur in some situations. Fixes #2865 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8167) (cherry picked from commit ef45aa14c5af024fcb8bef1c9007f3d1c115bd85)
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- Feb 05, 2019
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Sam Roberts authored
Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards, AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling. Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source. Backport-of: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8134)
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Sam Roberts authored
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8145) (cherry picked from commit 3499327bad401eb510d76266428923d06c9c7bb7)
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- Feb 04, 2019
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Matthias Kraft authored
Fixes #7732 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8158) (cherry picked from commit 66a60003719240399f6596e58c239df0465a4f70)
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batist73 authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8153) (cherry picked from commit adc7e221f12462c6e10bc7c2c7afaf52490cb292)
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