In keygen, return KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL not INVALID_KEYBITS.

** I also increased the minimum from 256 to 512, which is now
documented in CHANGES file. **

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

the session's version (server).

See also BoringSSL's commit bdf5e72f50e25f0e45e825c156168766d8442dde.

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

once the ChangeCipherSpec message is received. Previously, the server would
set the flag once at SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY and again at SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED.
This would allow a second CCS to arrive and would corrupt the server state.

(Because the first CCS would latch the correct keys and subsequent CCS
messages would have to be encrypted, a MitM attacker cannot exploit this,
though.)

Thanks to Joeri de Ruiter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The server must send a NewSessionTicket message if it advertised one
in the ServerHello, so make a missing ticket message an alert
in the client.

An equivalent change was independently made in BoringSSL, see commit
6444287806d801b9a45baf1f6f02a0e3a16e144c.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation:
ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends
the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would
reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was
announced in the initial ServerHello.

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this
will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures.

Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack
which can exploit this.

Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit e9128d94)

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Fix a bunch of typo's and speling (sic) errors in the CHANGES file.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@cryptsoft.com>

(If a change is already present in 1.0.1f or 1.0.1h,
don't list it again under changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2.)

(which didn't always handle value 0 correctly).

Reviewed-by:  <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Remove RFC5878 code. It is no longer needed for CT and has numerous bugs

Closes #116.

Add an NSS output format to sess_id to export to export the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format. PR#3352

Specify -f is for compilation flags. Add -d to synopsis section.

Closes #77.

Fix eckey_priv_encode to return an error on failure of i2d_ECPrivateKey.

A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.

Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023b881d7cd9f379b0c154650d6c108e9a3)

Enable TLS padding extension using official value from:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml

Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
(cherry picked from commit 66e8211c0b1347970096e04b18aa52567c325200)

Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140

Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be3483259de374f91e57d247d0fc667aef29)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES

Fix a limitation in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): use algorithm
specific chains instead of the shared chain.

Update docs.

For DTLS we might need to retransmit messages from the previous session
so keep a copy of write context in DTLS retransmission buffers instead
of replacing it after sending CCS. CVE-2013-6450.
(cherry picked from commit 34628967f1e65dc8f34e000f0f5518e21afbfc7b)

Fix padding calculation for different SSL_METHOD types. Use the
standard name as used in draft-agl-tls-padding-02

Based on a suggested workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771):
if the TLS Client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less
that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512.

To enable it use an unused extension number (for example 0x4242) using
e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_wtf=0x4242

WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE.

Add various functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
structure.

(This went into 1.0.2 too, so it's not actually a change
between 1.0.x and 1.1.0.)

the main branch (http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=19322) later added
to the 1.0.2 branch (http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=23113), and
thus not a change "between 1.0.2 and 1.1.0".