RT2943 only complains about the incorrect check of -K argument size,
we might as well do the same thing with the -iv argument.

Before this, we only checked that the given argument wouldn't give a
bitstring larger than EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH.  we can be more precise and
check against the size of the actual cipher used.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Was memset with wrong sizeof.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't do access check on destination directory; it breaks when euid/egid
is different from real uid/gid.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Incorrect name used for SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR.

Signed-off-by: mancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This is the last of Alok's PR260
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/176 (CHANGES)
 https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3545 (objects.txt)
 https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3796

 (verify.pod)

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add OSSL_NELEM macro to e_os.h to determine the number of elements in an
array.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

ONEDIRS, EDIRS and WDIRS aren't used anywhere.  Most probably remains
from a build system of the past, it's time they get put to rest.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Cleanup of files that haven't been used, touched, or I suspect, even
noticed for a long time.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Use sizeof *foo parameter, to avoid these errors.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

After the finale, the "real" final part. :)  Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

There were a dozen-plus instances of this construct:
   if (0) { label: ..... }

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov

Don't check for NULL before calling free functions. This gets:
        ERR_STATE_free
        ENGINE_free
        DSO_free
        CMAC_CTX_free
        COMP_CTX_free
        CONF_free
        NCONF_free NCONF_free_data _CONF_free_data
        A sk_free use within OBJ_sigid_free
        TS_TST_INFO_free (rest of TS_ API was okay)
        Doc update for UI_free (all uses were fine)
        X509V3_conf_free
        X509V3_section_free
        X509V3_string_free

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reformat CA.pl.in to follow coding style.
Also add "use strict" and "use warnings"
Also modify it to exit properly and report only when succeeded.
And some perl tweaks via Richard.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This gets BN_.*free:
    BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
    BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free

Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The problem occurs in EVP_PKEY_sign() when using RSA with X931 padding.
It is only triggered if the RSA key size is smaller than the digest length.
So with SHA512 you can trigger the overflow with anything less than an RSA
512 bit key. I managed to trigger a 62 byte overflow when using a 16 bit RSA
key. This wasn't sufficient to cause a crash, although your mileage may
vary.

In practice RSA keys of this length are never used and X931 padding is very
rare. Even if someone did use an excessively short RSA key, the chances of
them combining that with a longer digest and X931 padding is very
small. For these reasons I do not believe there is a security implication to
this. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Add a sanity check to the print_bin function to ensure that the |off|
argument is positive. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The static function dynamically allocates an output buffer if the output
grows larger than the static buffer that is normally used. The original
logic implied that |currlen| could be greater than |maxlen| which is
incorrect (and if so would cause a buffer overrun). Also the original
logic would call OPENSSL_malloc to create a dynamic buffer equal to the
size of the static buffer, and then immediately call OPENSSL_realloc to
make it bigger, rather than just creating a buffer than was big enough in
the first place. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

There was already a sanity check to ensure the passed buffer length is not
zero. Extend this to ensure that it also not negative. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The various implementations of EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS_AAD expect a buffer of at
least 13 bytes long. Add sanity checks to ensure that the length is at
least that. Also add a new constant (EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) to evp.h to
represent this length. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and
Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Add a sanity check to DES_enc_write to ensure the buffer length provided
is not negative. Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot
Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling free function.  This gets:
        NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free GENERAL_SUBTREE_free ECDSA_METHOD_free
        JPAKE_CTX_free OCSP_REQ_CTX_free SCT_free SRP_VBASE_free
        SRP_gN_free SRP_user_pwd_free TXT_DB_free

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>