- 09 Jul, 2015 1 commit
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- 07 Jul, 2015 8 commits
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Matt Caswell authored
The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fills in the help text for a number of options to verify that were blank. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Fills in a couple of verify options that were lacking documentation. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets |ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase where |ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs: 1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising in between. 2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes the value of |ctx->chain| directly. With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should not be supported to allow this. With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined. Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if |ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional verification tests. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error. Patch provided by the BoringSSL project. CVE-2015-1793 Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
There's no reason why we should default to a output format that is old, and confusing in some cases. This affects the commands "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509". Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 06 Jul, 2015 2 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows the tag length to be set without requiring the tag. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 30 Jun, 2015 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 29 Jun, 2015 3 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 28 Jun, 2015 2 commits
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 25 Jun, 2015 2 commits
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
PR#3923 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 24 Jun, 2015 1 commit
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- 23 Jun, 2015 14 commits
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Rich Salz authored
Move #include's inside the #ifdef. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
We always free the handshake buffer when digests are freed so move it into ssl_free_digest_list() Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op). Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer if digest array is NULL. Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records (needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication). Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible). Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc. Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure. Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Vitezslav Cizek authored
Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Found by Kurt Cancemi. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Russell Webb authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
A small rearrangement so the inclusion of rsaz_exp.h would be unconditional, but what that header defines becomes conditional. This solves the weirdness where rsaz_exp.h gets in and out of the dependency list for bn_exp.c, depending on the present architecture. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Typo in local variable name; introduced by previous fix. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 22 Jun, 2015 6 commits
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
If RSA or DSA is disabled we will never use a ciphersuite with RSA/DSA authentication as it is already filtered out by the cipher list logic. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
As numerous comments indicate the certificate and key array is not an appopriate structure to store the peers certificate: so remove it and just the s->session->peer instead. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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