- Dec 05, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless, be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads. Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released versions of OpenSSL are not affected. Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Add includes missing from commit 33eab3f6 Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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- Dec 04, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Always use goto err on failure and call ssl_cert_free() on the error path so all fields and "ret" itself are freed Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Jonas Maebe authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
The only support for SSLv2 left is receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Dec 03, 2014
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
than the mtu we are already using Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g. if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit fixes that. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
at least the minimum or it will fail. There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum mtu to use. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8 bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP). This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query checks consistent. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead. Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Dec 02, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
If SSLv2 and SSLv3 are both disabled we still support SSL/TLS. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Nov 28, 2014
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A"). This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required for the retry code path. Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh). Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Alok Menghrajani authored
The current documentation contains a bunch of spelling and grammar mistakes. I also found it hard to understand some paragraphs, so here is my attempt to improve its readability. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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- Nov 27, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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