Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Odd-length lists should be rejected everywhere upon parsing. Nevertheless,
be extra careful and add guards against off-by-one reads.

Also, drive-by replace inexplicable double-negation with an explicit comparison.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The Supported Elliptic Curves extension contains a vector of NamedCurves
of 2 bytes each, so the total length must be even. Accepting odd-length
lists was observed to lead to a non-exploitable one-byte out-of-bounds
read in the latest development branches (1.0.2 and master). Released
versions of OpenSSL are not affected.

Thanks to Felix Groebert of the Google Security Team for reporting this issue.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Add includes missing from commit 33eab3f6



Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Always use goto err on failure and call ssl_cert_free() on the error path so all
fields and "ret" itself are freed

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The only support for SSLv2 left is receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Bodo Moeller <bodo@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

than the mtu we are already using

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

and UDP header) when setting an mtu. This constant is not always correct (e.g.
if using IPv6). Use the new DTLS_CTRL functions instead.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

we will support then dtls1_do_write can go into an infinite loop. This commit
fixes that.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

at least the minimum or it will fail.
There were some instances in dtls1_query_mtu where the final mtu can end up
being less than the minimum, i.e. where the user has set an mtu manually. This
shouldn't be allowed. Also remove dtls1_guess_mtu that, despite having
logic for guessing an mtu, was actually only ever used to work out the minimum
mtu to use.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

and instead use the value provided by the underlying BIO. Also provide some
new DTLS_CTRLs so that the library user can set the mtu without needing to
know this constant. These new DTLS_CTRLs provide the capability to set the
link level mtu to be used (i.e. including this IP/UDP overhead). The previous
DTLS_CTRLs required the library user to subtract this overhead first.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

used with no explanation. Some of this was introduced as part of RT#1929. The
value 28 is the length of the IP header (20 bytes) plus the UDP header (8
bytes). However use of this constant is incorrect because there may be
instances where a different value is needed, e.g. an IPv4 header is 20 bytes
but an IPv6 header is 40. Similarly you may not be using UDP (e.g. SCTP).
This commit introduces a new BIO_CTRL that provides the value to be used for
this mtu "overhead". It will be used by subsequent commits.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

mtu that we have received is not less than the minimum. If its less it uses the
minimum instead. The second call to query the mtu does not do that, but
instead uses whatever comes back. We have seen an instance in RT#3592 where we
have got an unreasonably small mtu come back. This commit makes both query
checks consistent.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

automatically updated, and we should use the one provided instead.
Unfortunately there are a couple of locations where this is not respected.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

RT#3592 provides an instance where the OPENSSL_assert that this commit
replaces can be hit. I was able to recreate this issue by forcing the
underlying BIO to misbehave and come back with very small mtu values. This
happens the second time around the while loop after we have detected that the
MTU has been exceeded following the call to dtls1_write_bytes.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If SSLv2 and SSLv3 are both disabled we still support SSL/TLS.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Previously, state variant was not advanced, which resulted in state
being stuck in the st1 variant (usually "_A").

This broke certificate callback retry logic when accepting connections
that were using SSLv2 ClientHello (hence reusing the message), because
their state never advanced to SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C variant required
for the retry code path.

Reported by Yichun Zhang (agentzh).

Signed-off-by: Piotr Sikora <piotr@cloudflare.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>