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Ralf S. Engelschall
committed
_______________
This is a high-level summary of the most important changes.
For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example,
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
*) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one
thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that
the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application.
This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option
'enable-buildtest-c++'.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA.
[Patrick Steuer]
*) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024.
This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It
fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH
generation apps to use 2048 bits by default.
[Kurt Roeckx]
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*) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES,
EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust
util/fix-doc-nits accordingly.
[Paul Yang, Joshua Lock]
*) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine()
[Matt Caswell]
*) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme
along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging.
[Lorinczy Zsigmond]
*) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input
for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value
(IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length
and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12
bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16
bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any
additional leading bytes are ignored.
It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are
unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to
serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes
the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a
change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a
new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt
messages with a reused nonce.
Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS,
is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk
Greef of Ronomon.
(CVE-2019-1543)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm
[Paul Yang]
Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019]
*) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
to affine coordinates.
[Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
*) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
applications.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used
by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions
of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime
switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling
interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling
this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations.
*) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a
re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0().
[Richard Levitte]
*) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The
'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be
necessary to configure just to create a source distribution.
[Richard Levitte]
Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0734)
[Paul Dale]
*) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation
The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a
timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing
algorithm to recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser.
(CVE-2018-0735)
[Paul Dale]
*) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for
the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names
are retained for backwards compatibility.
[Antoine Salon]
*) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input
if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size
of two gigabytes and the error handling improved.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been
categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds
automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness
provided by the application.
*) Add a new ClientHello callback. Provides a callback interface that gives
the application the ability to adjust the nascent SSL object at the
earliest stage of ClientHello processing, immediately after extensions have
been collected but before they have been processed. In particular, this
callback can adjust the supported TLS versions in response to the contents
of the ClientHello
[Benjamin Kaduk]
*) Add SM2 base algorithm support.
[Jack Lloyd]
*) s390x assembly pack: add (improved) hardware-support for the following
cryptographic primitives: sha3, shake, aes-gcm, aes-ccm, aes-ctr, aes-ofb,
aes-cfb/cfb8, aes-ecb.
[Patrick Steuer]
*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder
step for prime curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from
differential addition-and-doubling in homogeneous projective coordinates
from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant
against side channel attacks" and Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves
and Side-Channel Attacks" Eq. (8) for y-coordinate recovery, modified
to work in projective coordinates.
[Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
Kurt Roeckx
committed
*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
to 2^-128.
[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) The 'tsget' script is renamed to 'tsget.pl', to avoid confusion when
moving between systems, and to avoid confusion when a Windows build is
done with mingw vs with MSVC. For POSIX installs, there's still a
symlink or copy named 'tsget' to avoid that confusion as well.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder
step for binary curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from
differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective
coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands.
[Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri]
*) Add a scaffold to optionally enhance the Montgomery ladder implementation
for `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (formerly `ec_mul_consttime`) allowing
EC_METHODs to implement their own specialized "ladder step", to take
advantage of more favorable coordinate systems or more efficient
differential addition-and-doubling algorithms.
[Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri]
*) Modified the random device based seed sources to keep the relevant
file descriptors open rather than reopening them on each access.
This allows such sources to operate in a chroot() jail without
the associated device nodes being available. This behaviour can be
controlled using RAND_keep_random_devices_open().
[Paul Dale]
*) Numerous side-channel attack mitigations have been applied. This may have
performance impacts for some algorithms for the benefit of improved
security. Specific changes are noted in this change log by their respective
authors.
[Matt Caswell]
*) AIX shared library support overhaul. Switch to AIX "natural" way of
handling shared libraries, which means collecting shared objects of
different versions and bitnesses in one common archive. This allows to
mitigate conflict between 1.0 and 1.1 side-by-side installations. It
doesn't affect the way 3rd party applications are linked, only how
multi-version installation is managed.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Make ec_group_do_inverse_ord() more robust and available to other
EC cryptosystems, so that irrespective of BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, SCA
mitigations are applied to the fallback BN_mod_inverse().
When using this function rather than BN_mod_inverse() directly, new
EC cryptosystem implementations are then safer-by-default.
[Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Add coordinate blinding for EC_POINT and implement projective
coordinate blinding for generic prime curves as a countermeasure to
chosen point SCA attacks.
[Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
*) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input
length does not exceed the maximum supported digest length when performing
a sign, verify or verifyrecover operation.
[Matt Caswell]
*) SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is enabled by default. Applications that use blocking
I/O in combination with something like select() or poll() will hang. This
can be turned off again using SSL_CTX_clear_mode().
Many applications do not properly handle non-application data records, and
TLS 1.3 sends more of such records. Setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY works
around the problems in those applications, but can also break some.
It's recommended to read the manpages about SSL_read(), SSL_write(),
SSL_get_error(), SSL_shutdown(), SSL_CTX_set_mode() and
SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() again.
[Kurt Roeckx]
Richard Levitte
committed
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Apply blinding to binary field modular inversion and remove patent
pending (OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV) BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation.
[Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Deprecate ec2_mult.c and unify scalar multiplication code paths for
binary and prime elliptic curves.
[Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Remove ECDSA nonce padding: EC_POINT_mul is now responsible for
constant time fixed point multiplication.
[Billy Bob Brumley]
*) Revise elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack
defenses: ec_wNAF_mul redirects to a constant time implementation
when computing fixed point and variable point multiplication (which
in OpenSSL are mostly used with secret scalars in keygen, sign,
ECDH derive operations).
[Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri, Cesar Pereida García,
Sohaib ul Hassan]
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*) Updated CONTRIBUTING
[Rich Salz]
*) Updated DRBG / RAND to request nonce and additional low entropy
randomness from the system.
[Matthias St. Pierre]
*) Updated 'openssl rehash' to use OpenSSL consistent default.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Moved the load of the ssl_conf module to libcrypto, which helps
loading engines that libssl uses before libssl is initialised.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Added EVP_PKEY_sign() and EVP_PKEY_verify() for EdDSA
[Matt Caswell]
*) Fixed X509_NAME_ENTRY_set to get multi-valued RDNs right in all cases.
[Ingo Schwarze, Rich Salz]
*) Added output of accepting IP address and port for 'openssl s_server'
[Richard Levitte]
*) Added a new API for TLSv1.3 ciphersuites:
SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites()
SSL_set_ciphersuites()
[Matt Caswell]
*) Memory allocation failures consistenly add an error to the error
stack.
[Rich Salz]
*) Don't use OPENSSL_ENGINES and OPENSSL_CONF environment values
in libcrypto when run as setuid/setgid.
[Bernd Edlinger]
*) Load any config file by default when libssl is used.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Added new public header file <openssl/rand_drbg.h> and documentation
for the RAND_DRBG API. See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for an overview.
[Matthias St. Pierre]
*) QNX support removed (cannot find contributors to get their approval
for the license change).
[Rich Salz]
*) TLSv1.3 replay protection for early data has been implemented. See the
SSL_read_early_data() man page for further details.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Separated TLSv1.3 ciphersuite configuration out from TLSv1.2 ciphersuite
configuration. TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.2 and
below. Similarly TLSv1.2 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.3.
In order to avoid issues where legacy TLSv1.2 ciphersuite configuration
would otherwise inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites the
configuration has been separated out. See the ciphers man page or the
SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() man page for more information.
[Matt Caswell]
*) On POSIX (BSD, Linux, ...) systems the ocsp(1) command running
in responder mode now supports the new "-multi" option, which
spawns the specified number of child processes to handle OCSP
requests. The "-timeout" option now also limits the OCSP
responder's patience to wait to receive the full client request
on a newly accepted connection. Child processes are respawned
as needed, and the CA index file is automatically reloaded
when changed. This makes it possible to run the "ocsp" responder
as a long-running service, making the OpenSSL CA somewhat more
feature-complete. In this mode, most diagnostic messages logged
after entering the event loop are logged via syslog(3) rather than
written to stderr.
[Viktor Dukhovni]
*) Added support for X448 and Ed448. Heavily based on original work by
Mike Hamburg.
*) Extend OSSL_STORE with capabilities to search and to narrow the set of
objects loaded. This adds the functions OSSL_STORE_expect() and
OSSL_STORE_find() as well as needed tools to construct searches and
get the search data out of them.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Support for TLSv1.3 added. Note that users upgrading from an earlier
version of OpenSSL should review their configuration settings to ensure
that they are still appropriate for TLSv1.3. For further information see:
https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3
*) Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator
The default RAND method now utilizes an AES-CTR DRBG according to
NIST standard SP 800-90Ar1. The new random generator is essentially
a port of the default random generator from the OpenSSL FIPS 2.0
object module. It is a hybrid deterministic random bit generator
using an AES-CTR bit stream and which seeds and reseeds itself
automatically using trusted system entropy sources.
Some of its new features are:
o Support for multiple DRBG instances with seed chaining.
o The default RAND method makes use of a DRBG.
o There is a public and private DRBG instance.
o The DRBG instances are fork-safe.
o Keep all global DRBG instances on the secure heap if it is enabled.
o The public and private DRBG instance are per thread for lock free
operation
[Paul Dale, Benjamin Kaduk, Kurt Roeckx, Rich Salz, Matthias St. Pierre]
*) Changed Configure so it only says what it does and doesn't dump
so much data. Instead, ./configdata.pm should be used as a script
to display all sorts of configuration data.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Added processing of "make variables" to Configure.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Added SHA512/224 and SHA512/256 algorithm support.
[Paul Dale]
*) The last traces of Netware support, first removed in 1.1.0, have
now been removed.
[Rich Salz]
*) Get rid of Makefile.shared, and in the process, make the processing
of certain files (rc.obj, or the .def/.map/.opt files produced from
the ordinal files) more visible and hopefully easier to trace and
debug (or make silent).
[Richard Levitte]
*) Make it possible to have environment variable assignments as
arguments to config / Configure.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Add multi-prime RSA (RFC 8017) support.
[Paul Yang]
*) Add SM3 implemented according to GB/T 32905-2016
[ Jack Lloyd <jack.lloyd@ribose.com>,
Ronald Tse <ronald.tse@ribose.com>,
Erick Borsboom <erick.borsboom@ribose.com> ]
*) Add 'Maximum Fragment Length' TLS extension negotiation and support
as documented in RFC6066.
Based on a patch from Tomasz Moń
[Filipe Raimundo da Silva]
*) Add SM4 implemented according to GB/T 32907-2016.
[ Jack Lloyd <jack.lloyd@ribose.com>,
Ronald Tse <ronald.tse@ribose.com>,
Erick Borsboom <erick.borsboom@ribose.com> ]
*) Reimplement -newreq-nodes and ERR_error_string_n; the
original author does not agree with the license change.
[Rich Salz]
*) Add ARIA AEAD TLS support.
[Jon Spillett]
*) Some macro definitions to support VS6 have been removed. Visual
Studio 6 has not worked since 1.1.0
[Rich Salz]
*) Add ERR_clear_last_mark(), to allow callers to clear the last mark
without clearing the errors.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Add "atfork" functions. If building on a system that without
pthreads, see doc/man3/OPENSSL_fork_prepare.pod for application
requirements. The RAND facility now uses/requires this.
[Rich Salz]
*) The UI API becomes a permanent and integral part of libcrypto, i.e.
not possible to disable entirely. However, it's still possible to
disable the console reading UI method, UI_OpenSSL() (use UI_null()
as a fallback).
To disable, configure with 'no-ui-console'. 'no-ui' is still
possible to use as an alias. Check at compile time with the
macro OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE. The macro OPENSSL_NO_UI is still
possible to check and is an alias for OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Add a STORE module, which implements a uniform and URI based reader of
stores that can contain keys, certificates, CRLs and numerous other
objects. The main API is loosely based on a few stdio functions,
and includes OSSL_STORE_open, OSSL_STORE_load, OSSL_STORE_eof,
OSSL_STORE_error and OSSL_STORE_close.
The implementation uses backends called "loaders" to implement arbitrary
URI schemes. There is one built in "loader" for the 'file' scheme.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Add devcrypto engine. This has been implemented against cryptodev-linux,
then adjusted to work on FreeBSD 8.4 as well.
Enable by configuring with 'enable-devcryptoeng'. This is done by default
on BSD implementations, as cryptodev.h is assumed to exist on all of them.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Module names can prefixed with OSSL_ or OPENSSL_. This affects
util/mkerr.pl, which is adapted to allow those prefixes, leading to
error code calls like this:
OSSL_FOOerr(OSSL_FOO_F_SOMETHING, OSSL_FOO_R_WHATEVER);
With this change, we claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL in a manner
that can be encoded in C. For the foreseeable future, this will only
affect new modules.
[Richard Levitte and Tim Hudson]
*) Removed BSD cryptodev engine.
[Rich Salz]
*) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files
and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires
things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything
to that system and do the rest of the build there.
[Richard Levitte]
*) In the UI interface, make it possible to duplicate the user data. This
can be used by engines that need to retain the data for a longer time
than just the call where this user data is passed.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Ignore the '-named_curve auto' value for compatibility of applications
with OpenSSL 1.0.2.
[Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>]
*) Fragmented SSL/TLS alerts are no longer accepted. An alert message is 2
bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such
alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice
it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3
prohibts this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not
support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the
record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause inter-operability
issues.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Add the ASN.1 types INT32, UINT32, INT64, UINT64 and variants prefixed
with Z. These are meant to replace LONG and ZLONG and to be size safe.
The use of LONG and ZLONG is discouraged and scheduled for deprecation
in OpenSSL 1.2.0.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Add the 'z' and 'j' modifiers to BIO_printf() et al formatting string,
'z' is to be used for [s]size_t, and 'j' - with [u]int64_t.
[Richard Levitte, Andy Polyakov]
*) Add EC_KEY_get0_engine(), which does for EC_KEY what RSA_get0_engine()
does for RSA, etc.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
platform rather than 'mingw'.
[Richard Levitte]
*) The functions X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl return
success if they are asked to add an object which already exists
in the store. This change cascades to other functions which load
certificates and CRLs.
[Paul Dale]
*) x86_64 assembly pack: annotate code with DWARF CFI directives to
facilitate stack unwinding even from assembly subroutines.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Remove VAX C specific definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN.
Also remove OPENSSL_GLOBAL entirely, as it became a no-op.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c.
VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1,
which is the minimum version we support.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
are no longer allowed.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Add support for ARIA
[Paul Dale]
*) s_client will now send the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension by
default unless the new "-noservername" option is used. The server name is
based on the host provided to the "-connect" option unless overridden by
using "-servername".
[Matt Caswell]
*) Add support for SipHash
[Todd Short]
*) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0
or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to
prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually
sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them.
[Matt Caswell]
*) 'openssl passwd' can now produce SHA256 and SHA512 based output,
using the algorithm defined in
https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt
[Richard Levitte]
*) Heartbeat support has been removed; the ABI is changed for now.
[Richard Levitte, Rich Salz]
*) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) The RSA "null" method, which was partially supported to avoid patent
issues, has been replaced to always returns NULL.
[Rich Salz]
Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
(CVE-2018-0732)
[Guido Vranken]
*) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
(CVE-2018-0737)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
to 2^-128.
[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
[Matt Caswell]
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
are no longer allowed.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a
signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts
line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators
at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that
some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace
and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix
could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data
signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of
OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data
and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set
the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()).
[Matt Caswell]
Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018]
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*) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack
Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found
in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There
are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources
so this is considered safe.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz
project.
(CVE-2018-0739)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC
Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is
effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each
byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as
authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the
security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the
HP-UX assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg
(IBM).
(CVE-2018-0733)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files
and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires
things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything
to that system and do the rest of the build there.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Backport SSL_OP_NO_RENGOTIATION
OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the
(undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity
changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new
SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to
1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality.
Note that if an application built against 1.1.0h headers (or above) is run
using an older version of 1.1.0 (prior to 1.1.0h) then the option will be
accepted but nothing will happen, i.e. renegotiation will not be prevented.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Removed the OS390-Unix config target. It relied on a script that doesn't
exist.
[Rich Salz]
*) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64
There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure
used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected.
Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this
defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely.
Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the
work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed
offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be
significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server
would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is
no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701.
This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions
like Intel Haswell (4th generation).
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue
was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project.
(CVE-2017-3738)
[Andy Polyakov]
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Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017]
*) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients.
This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions
like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
(CVE-2017-3736)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read
If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension,
OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result
would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
(CVE-2017-3735)
[Rich Salz]
Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.0f [25 May 2017]
*) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target
platform rather than 'mingw'.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c.
VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1,
which is the minimum version we support.
[Richard Levitte]
Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017]
*) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash
During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is
negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then
this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients
and servers are affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat).
(CVE-2017-3733)
[Matt Caswell]
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Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017]
*) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read
If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific
cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to
perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google.
(CVE-2017-3731)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash
If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key
exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a
NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial
of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken.
(CVE-2017-3730)
[Matt Caswell]
*) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64
There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring
procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks
against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to
perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just
feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to
deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount
of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and
likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would
additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target
private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private
key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by
default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very
similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project.
(CVE-2017-3732)
[Andy Polyakov]
Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016]
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*) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow
TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to
a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL
crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team)
(CVE-2016-7054)
[Richard Levitte]
*) CMS Null dereference
Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer
dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE
type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the
structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings.
Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are
affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure.
(CVE-2016-7053)
[Stephen Henson]
*) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results
There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery
multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but
longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA
and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in
question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input
of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as
transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible
erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input.
Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one
presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in
detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely
multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to
share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour.
Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected.
This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not
initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for
providing reproducible case.
(CVE-2016-7055)
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables,
as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more.
[Richard Levitte]
Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016]
*) Fix Use After Free for large message sizes
The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a
message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to
store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a
dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to
write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a
crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code.
This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki.
(CVE-2016-6309)
[Matt Caswell]
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Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016]
*) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request
extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a
large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded
memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of
Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default
configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using
the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6304)
[Matt Caswell]
*) SSL_peek() hang on empty record
OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer
sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a
Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor.
(CVE-2016-6305)
[Matt Caswell]
*) Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() and
dtls1_preprocess_fragment()
A (D)TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the
message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of
this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a
peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory
being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version
1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to
the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in
OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated
to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through
memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes
place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming
that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely
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manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed
again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in
nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if:
1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event
that the connection fails
or
2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is
very little free memory
or
3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are
multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the
connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient
memory to service the multiple requests.
Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be
transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is
subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an
increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of
memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.)
(CVE-2016-6307 and CVE-2016-6308)
[Matt Caswell]
*) solaris-x86-cc, i.e. 32-bit configuration with vendor compiler,
had to be removed. Primary reason is that vendor assembler can't
assemble our modules with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly
support, was not even available as option. But its lack means
lack of side-channel resistant code, which is incompatible with