This replaces the old SKIP primes with the most current Diffie-Hellman
MODP groups defined by RFC 7296 and RFC 3526.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from GitHub https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/775)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

CVE-2016-2107

MR: #2572

Add tests for ASN.1 INTEGER: invalid tag, valid 0, 1, -1 and 0, -1 with
illegal padding.

Also add ASN1_ANY tests for 0, 1 and -1.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER
tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used
for on the wire encoding.

Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug.

This was found using libFuzzer.

RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108.

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to
determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the
amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a
sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error
condition.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for
Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large
amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap
corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most
likely result in a crash.

Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the
PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the
OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes
data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be
considered vulnerable to this issue.

User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of
untrusted data may also be vulnerable.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2105

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in
applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems.
This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-2176

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reported by David Benjamin

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Date:   Tue Mar 15 15:19:44 2016 +0100

This commit updates the documentation of cms, ocsp, s_client,
s_server, and verify to reflect the new "-no_check_time"
option introduced in commit d35ff2c0


on 2015-07-31.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake,
but simply omit/skip that extension.

Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo
registration.

Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the
same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Use the environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR to find build
file templates as well.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

The environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is used to indicate
that there's a local directory with extra configuration files.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

As per a team decision back in 2014.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Fix some of the variables to be (s)size_t, so that more than 1GB of
secure memory can be allocated. The arena has to be a power of 2, and
2GB fails because it ends up being a negative 32-bit signed number.

The |too_late| flag is not strictly necessary; it is easy to figure
out if something is secure memory by looking at the arena. As before,
secure memory allocations will not fail, but now they can be freed
correctly. Once initialized, secure memory can still be used, even if
allocations occured before initialization.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This macro was defined by no-longer-supported __MWERKS__ compiler.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Usage of $ymm variable is a bit misleading here, it doesn't refer
to %ymm register bank, but rather to VEX instruction encoding,
which AMD XOP code path depends on.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Some X509_STORE macros do not work since the type was made opaque.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject
excessively large X509_NAME structures.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne().

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some
part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to
restrictions on certificate size.

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>