- Oct 30, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7483)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7483)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7484)
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Richard Levitte authored
The EVP_PKEY methods for CMAC and HMAC needed a rework, although it wasn't much change apart from name changes. This also meant that EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() needed an adjustment. (the possibility to rewrite this function to work with any MAC is yet to be explored) Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7484)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7484)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7484)
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Chocobo1 authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7444)
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- Oct 29, 2018
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Vitezslav Cizek authored
dsa_builtin_paramgen2 expects the L parameter to be greater than N, otherwise the generation will get stuck in an infinite loop. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7493)
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Richard Levitte authored
When wanting to compare the end of a string with another string, make sure not to start somewhere before the start of the first string. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7520)
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Richard Levitte authored
pkey_test_ctrl() was designed for parsing values, not for using in test runs. Relying on its returned value when it returned 1 even for control errors made it particularly useless for mac_test_run(). Here, it gets replaced with a MAC specific control function, that parses values the same way but is designed for use in a _run() rather than a _parse() function. This uncovers a SipHash test with an invalid control that wasn't caught properly. After all, that stanza is supposed to test that invalid control values do generate an error. Now we catch that. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7500)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7501)
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #7497 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7501)
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Richard Levitte authored
We made the build of foo.obj depend on foo.d, meaning the latter gets built first. Unfortunately, the way the compiler works, we are forced to redirect all output to foo.d, meaning that if the source contains an error, the build fails without showing those errors. We therefore remove the dependency and force the build of foo.d to always happen after build of foo.obj. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7469)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7194)
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Richard Levitte authored
Needed to clear a clash between ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings and ERR_load_crypto_strings Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7194)
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Richard Levitte authored
Believe it or not, the VMS C compiler is remarking on this Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7194)
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Richard Levitte authored
These functions are generalizations of EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl() and EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(). They will parse the value, and then pass the parsed result and length to a callback that knows exactly how to pass them on to a main _ctrl function, along with a context structure pointer. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
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Richard Levitte authored
If a MAC isn't available as an EVP_MAC, the MAC test falls back to the corresponding EVP_PKEY method. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
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Richard Levitte authored
The MAC EVP_PKEY implementations are currently implemented for each MAC. However, with the EVP_MAC API, only one such implementation is needed. This implementation takes into account the differences between HMAC and CMAC implementations, and observes that all other current MAC implementations seem to follow the HMAC model. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
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Richard Levitte authored
We currently implement EVP MAC methods as EVP_PKEY methods. This change creates a separate EVP API for MACs, to replace the current EVP_PKEY ones. A note about this EVP API and how it interfaces with underlying MAC implementations: Other EVP APIs pass the EVP API context down to implementations, and it can be observed that the implementations use the pointer to their own private data almost exclusively. The EVP_MAC API deviates from that pattern by passing the pointer to the implementation's private data directly, and thereby deny the implementations access to the EVP_MAC context structure. This change is made to provide a clearer separation between the EVP library itself and the implementations of its supported algorithm classes. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7393)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7504)
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- Oct 28, 2018
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7510)
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Pauli authored
Preallocate an extra limb for some of the big numbers to avoid a reallocation that can potentially provide a side channel. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
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Pauli authored
Avoid a timing attack that leaks information via a side channel that triggers when a BN is resized. Increasing the size of the BNs prior to doing anything with them suppresses the attack. Thanks due to Samuel Weiser for finding and locating this. Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486)
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Pauli authored
There is a side channel attack against the division used to calculate one of the modulo inverses in the DSA algorithm. This change takes advantage of the primality of the modulo and Fermat's little theorem to calculate the inverse without leaking information. Thanks to Samuel Weiser for finding and reporting this. Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7487)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Found by Coverity Scan Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7511)
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Richard Levitte authored
This also gave enough reason to collect the stuff that's common for all iOS config targets into the template "ios-common". Fixes #7318 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7403)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The new Configure summary box (41349b5e) now hides the warning about the missing seed source (2805ee1e ) too much. To make it more visible again, add warning markers. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7509)
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- Oct 27, 2018
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Fraser Tweedale authored
The Name Constraints extension contains GeneralSubtree values indicating included or excluded subtrees. It is defined as: GeneralSubtree ::= SEQUENCE { base GeneralName, minimum [0] BaseDistance DEFAULT 0, maximum [1] BaseDistance OPTIONAL } RFC 5280 further specifies: Within this profile, the minimum and maximum fields are not used with any name forms, thus, the minimum MUST be zero, and maximum MUST be absent. Because the minimum fields has DEFAULT 0, and certificates should be encoded using DER, the situation where minimum = 0 occurs in a certificate should not arise. Nevertheless, it does arise. For example, I have seen certificates issued by Microsoft programs that contain GeneralSubtree values encoded thus. Enhance the Name Constraints matching routine to handle the case where minimum is specified. If present, it must be zero. The maximum field remains prohibited. Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7039)
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- Oct 26, 2018
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Fixes #7394 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7399)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7414)
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Matt Caswell authored
Since 1fb9fdc3 we may attempt to buffer a record from the next epoch that has already been buffered. Prior to that this never occurred. We simply ignore a failure to buffer a duplicated record. Fixes #6902 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7414)
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Bernd Edlinger authored
Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7474)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
In commit 820e414d (pr #5247) the summary output of the Configure command was optimized towards instructing people how to create issue reports. It turned out that the wording of this message can confuse new OpenSSL users and make them think that they are seeing an error message. This commit makes the summary output start with a success to prevent a misunderstanding. Also it gives more hints to new OpenSSL users. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7499)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Commit 5b4cb385 (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed without querying the available entropy sources. This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check, it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data. More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy source was configured (which is the default on most os): - If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular reseeding. - If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
Increase the load buffer size such that it exceeds the chunk size by a comfortable amount. This is done to avoid calling RAND_add() with a small final chunk. Instead, such a small final chunk will be added together with the previous chunk (unless it's the only one). Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
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Dr. Matthias St. Pierre authored
The failure of RAND_load_file was only noticed because of the heap corruption which was reported in #7499 and fixed in commit 5b4cb385 . To prevent this in the future, RAND_load_file() now explicitly checks RAND_status() and reports an error if it fails. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
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- Oct 25, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
When building shared libraries on Windows, we had a clash between 'libcrypto.lib' the static routine library and 'libcrypto.lib' the import library. We now change it so the static versions of our libraries get '_static' appended to their names. These will never get installed, but can still be used for our internal purposes, such as internal tests. When building non-shared, the renaming mechanism doesn't come into play. In that case, the static libraries 'libcrypto.lib' and 'libssl.lib' are installed, just as always. Fixes #7492 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7496)
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- Oct 23, 2018
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Richard Levitte authored
This value is used to set DRBG_MAX_LENGTH Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7467)
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