or not.

His comments are:

1) Changes all references for `True64' to be `Tru64', which is the correct
spelling for the OS name.

2) Makes `alpha-cc' be the same as `alpha164-cc', and adds an `alphaold-cc'
entry that is the same as the previous `alpha-cc'.  The reason is that most
people these days are using the newer compiler, so it should be the default.

3) Adds a bit of commentary to Configure, regarding the name changes of
the OS over the years, so it's not so confusing to people that haven't been
with the OS for a while.

4) Adds an `alpha-cc-rpath' target (which is *not* selected automatically
by Configure under any circumstance) that builds an RPATH into the
shared libraries.  This is explained in the comment in Configure.  It's
very very useful for people that want it, and people that don't want it
just shouldn't choose that target.

5) Adds the `-pthread' flag as the best way to get POSIX thread support
from the newer compiler.

6) ...

ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped.

Submitted by:  Petr Lampa <lampa@fee.vutbr.cz>

circumstances.

or bogus DH parameters can be used for launching DOS attacks

Submitted by: Travis Vitek <vitek@roguewave.com>

'OpenSSL_0_9_6-stable'.

OpenBSD /dev/crypto (this will be revamped later when the appropriate machinery
is available).

His comments are:

This patch fixes the problem of modern Kerberos using "derived keys"
to encrypt the authenticator by disabling the authenticator check
for all derived keys enctypes.

I think I've got all the bugfixes that Jeffrey and I discussed rolled
into this.  There were some problems with Jeffrey's code to convert
the authenticator's Kerberos timestring into struct tm (e.g. Z, -1900;
it helps to have an actual decryptable authenticator to play with).
So I've shamelessly pushed in my code, while stealing some bits from
Jeffrey.

'OpenSSL_0_9_6-stable'.

does not contain more bytes than the RSA modulus 'n' - it does not check
that the input is strictly *less* than 'n'. Whether this should be the
case or not is open to debate - however, due to security problems with
returning miscalculated CRT results, the 'rsa_mod_exp' implementation in
rsa_eay.c now performs a public-key exponentiation to verify the CRT result
and in the event of an error will instead recalculate and return a non-CRT
(more expensive) mod_exp calculation. As the mod_exp of 'I' is equivalent
to the mod_exp of 'I mod n', and the verify result is automatically between
0 and n-1 inclusive, the verify only matches the input if 'I' was less than
'n', otherwise even a correct CRT calculation is only congruent to 'I' (ie.
they differ by a multiple of 'n'). Rather than rejecting correct
calculations and doing redundant and slower ones instead, this changes the
equality check in the verification code to a congruence check.