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  1. Jul 20, 2001
    • Lutz Jänicke's avatar
      Updated explanation. · c0bee3c8
      Lutz Jänicke authored
      c0bee3c8
    • Lutz Jänicke's avatar
      Some more documentation bits. · 79e29dca
      Lutz Jänicke authored
      79e29dca
    • cvs2svn's avatar
      This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch · 04bdca29
      cvs2svn authored
      'OpenSSL_0_9_6-stable'.
      04bdca29
    • Lutz Jänicke's avatar
      Some more documentation bits. · 2d3b6a5b
      Lutz Jänicke authored
      2d3b6a5b
    • Geoff Thorpe's avatar
      Currently, RSA code, when using no padding scheme, simply checks that input · 81d1998e
      Geoff Thorpe authored
      does not contain more bytes than the RSA modulus 'n' - it does not check
      that the input is strictly *less* than 'n'. Whether this should be the
      case or not is open to debate - however, due to security problems with
      returning miscalculated CRT results, the 'rsa_mod_exp' implementation in
      rsa_eay.c now performs a public-key exponentiation to verify the CRT result
      and in the event of an error will instead recalculate and return a non-CRT
      (more expensive) mod_exp calculation. As the mod_exp of 'I' is equivalent
      to the mod_exp of 'I mod n', and the verify result is automatically between
      0 and n-1 inclusive, the verify only matches the input if 'I' was less than
      'n', otherwise even a correct CRT calculation is only congruent to 'I' (ie.
      they differ by a multiple of 'n'). Rather than rejecting correct
      calculations and doing redundant and slower ones instead, this changes the
      equality check in the verification code to a congruence check.
      81d1998e
  2. Jul 17, 2001
  3. Jul 16, 2001
  4. Jul 15, 2001
  5. Jul 13, 2001
    • Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar
      · 534a1ed0
      Dr. Stephen Henson authored
      Allow OCSP server to handle multiple requests.
      
      Document new OCSP options.
      534a1ed0
  6. Jul 12, 2001
  7. Jul 11, 2001
  8. Jul 10, 2001