Instead of piping through tardy, and possibly suffering from bugs in certain
versions, use --transform, --owner and --group directly with GNU tar (we
already expect that tar variant).

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 27f98436)

Conflicts:
	Makefile.org

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 99dcd880)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 2a7059c5)

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This is a follow up to the alternate chains certificate forgery issue
(CVE-2015-1793). That issue is exacerbated in 1.0.1 by a related bug which
means that we *always* check for an alternative chain, even if we have
already found a chain. The code is supposed to stop as soon as it has found
one (and does do in master and 1.0.2).

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

The function X509_verify_cert checks the value of |ctx->chain| at the
beginning, and if it is NULL then it initialises it, along with the value
of ctx->untrusted. The normal way to use X509_verify_cert() is to first
call X509_STORE_CTX_init(); then set up various parameters etc; then call
X509_verify_cert(); then check the results; and finally call
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(). The initial call to X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets
|ctx->chain| to NULL. The only place in the OpenSSL codebase  where
|ctx->chain| is set to anything other than a non NULL value is in
X509_verify_cert itself. Therefore the only ways that |ctx->chain| could be
non NULL on entry to X509_verify_cert is if one of the following occurs:
1) An application calls X509_verify_cert() twice without re-initialising
in between.
2) An application reaches inside the X509_STORE_CTX structure and changes
the value of |ctx->chain| directly.

With regards to the second of these, we should discount this - it should
not be supported to allow this.

With regards to the first of these, the documentation is not exactly
crystal clear, but the implication is that you must call
X509_STORE_CTX_init() before each call to X509_verify_cert(). If you fail
to do this then, at best, the results would be undefined.

Calling X509_verify_cert() with |ctx->chain| set to a non NULL value is
likely to have unexpected results, and could be dangerous. This commit
changes the behaviour of X509_verify_cert() so that it causes an error if
|ctx->chain| is anything other than NULL (because this indicates that we
have not been initialised properly). It also clarifies the associated
documentation. This is a follow up commit to CVE-2015-1793.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This adds a test for CVE-2015-1793. This adds a new test file
verify_extra_test.c, which could form the basis for additional
verification tests.

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	test/Makefile

During certificate verfification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an
alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain
fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an
attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be
bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf
certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.

This occurs where at least one cert is added to the first chain from the
trust store, but that chain still ends up being untrusted. In that case
ctx->last_untrusted is decremented in error.

Patch provided by the BoringSSL project.

CVE-2015-1793

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

In CCM mode don't require a tag before initialising decrypt: this allows
the tag length to be set without requiring the tag.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 9cca7be1)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5727582c)

The PSK identity hint should be stored in the SSL_SESSION structure
and not in the parent context (which will overwrite values used
by other SSL structures with the same SSL_CTX).

Use BUF_strndup when copying identity as it may not be null terminated.

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 3c66a669)

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5fced239)

PR#3923

Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ffbf304d)

Typo in local variable name; introduced by previous fix.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit cc3f3fc2)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 75ba5c58)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8ca96efd)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit d62c98c8)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 96462695)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 7a1789d2)

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f4c73bfe)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c

More fprintf()s and printf()s to turn into BIO calls.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Construct bio_err and bio_stdout from file handles instead of FILE
pointers, since the latter might not be implemented (when OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
is defined).
Convert all output to use BIO_printf.
Change lh_foo to lh_SSL_SESSION_foo.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit bb8abd67)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 5c78e183)

Conflicts:
	crypto/threads/mttest.c

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit a3f92865)

Backport to 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 to fix RT 3905

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 8e6bb999)

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit b4f0d1a4)

Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 30cf9178)

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

It is valid for an extension block to be present in a ClientHello, but to
be of zero length.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.

Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.

Conflicts:
	crypto/hmac/hmac.c

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

CVE-2015-1788

Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit 4924b37e)

Updates to CHANGES and NEWS to take account of the latest security fixes.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

CVE-2015-1790

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Also tighten X509_cmp_time to reject more than three fractional
seconds in the time; and to reject trailing garbage after the offset.

CVE-2015-1789

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>