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  1. Nov 27, 2013
  2. Nov 12, 2013
  3. Nov 11, 2013
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  7. Nov 06, 2013
  8. Nov 03, 2013
  9. Nov 01, 2013
    • Robin Seggelmann's avatar
      DTLS/SCTP Finished Auth Bug · 025f7dbd
      Robin Seggelmann authored
      PR: 2808
      
      With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
      FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
      master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
      key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
      new key.  Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
      the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
      computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
      immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
      compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
      So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
      becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
      still sent with the old key.
      (cherry picked from commit 9fb523ad)
      (cherry picked from commit b9ef52b0)
      025f7dbd
    • Robin Seggelmann's avatar
      DTLS/SCTP struct authchunks Bug · 44f4934b
      Robin Seggelmann authored
      PR: 2809
      
      DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
      SCTP-AUTH.  It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
      the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
      gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
      FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
      This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
      whether or not this bug is present.
      (cherry picked from commit f596e3c4)
      (cherry picked from commit b8140811)
      44f4934b
  10. Oct 20, 2013
    • Nick Mathewson's avatar
      453ca706
    • Dr. Stephen Henson's avatar
      Don't use RSA+MD5 with TLS 1.2 · 5e1ff664
      Dr. Stephen Henson authored
      Since the TLS 1.2 supported signature algorithms extension is less
      sophisticaed in OpenSSL 1.0.1 this has to be done in two stages.
      
      RSA+MD5 is removed from supported signature algorithms extension:
      any compliant implementation should never use RSA+MD5 as a result.
      
      To cover the case of a broken implementation using RSA+MD5 anyway
      disable lookup of MD5 algorithm in TLS 1.2.
      5e1ff664
  11. Oct 19, 2013
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