PR: 3189
Submitted by: Oscar Ciurana
(cherry picked from commit c5d5f5bd)

PR: 3165
Submitted by: Daniel Richard G.
(cherry picked from commit 2df9ec01)
(cherry picked from commit 0de70011)

PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit 220d1e53)

PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit d1cf23ac)

(cherry picked from commit 16bc45ba)

(cherry picked from commit 5c50462e)

(cherry picked from commit 60adefa6)

(cherry picked from commit 01be36ef70525e81fc358d2e559bdd0a0d9427a5)

(cherry picked from commit 7040d73d22987532faa503630d6616cf2788c975)

Original definition depended on __LONG_MAX__ that is not guaranteed to
be present. As we don't support platforms with int narrower that 32 bits
it's appropriate to make defition inconditional.

PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit 96180cac)

PR: 3165
(cherry picked from commit d24d1d7d)

Enable PSK ciphersuites with AES or DES3 in FIPS mode.
(cherry picked from commit e0ffd129)

(cherry picked from commit a4947e4e)

<christian@python.org>.

PR: 2808

With DTLS/SCTP the SCTP extension SCTP-AUTH is used to protect DATA and
FORWARD-TSN chunks. The key for this extension is derived from the
master secret and changed with the next ChangeCipherSpec, whenever a new
key has been negotiated. The following Finished then already uses the
new key.  Unfortunately, the ChangeCipherSpec and Finished are part of
the same flight as the ClientKeyExchange, which is necessary for the
computation of the new secret. Hence, these messages are sent
immediately following each other, leaving the server very little time to
compute the new secret and pass it to SCTP before the finished arrives.
So the Finished is likely to be discarded by SCTP and a retransmission
becomes necessary. To prevent this issue, the Finished of the client is
still sent with the old key.
(cherry picked from commit 9fb523ad)
(cherry picked from commit b9ef52b0)

PR: 2809

DTLS/SCTP requires DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks to be protected with
SCTP-AUTH.  It is checked if this has been activated successfully for
the local and remote peer. Due to a bug, however, the
gauth_number_of_chunks field of the authchunks struct is missing on
FreeBSD, and was therefore not considered in the OpenSSL implementation.
This patch sets the corresponding pointer for the check correctly
whether or not this bug is present.
(cherry picked from commit f596e3c4)
(cherry picked from commit b8140811)

Since the TLS 1.2 supported signature algorithms extension is less
sophisticaed in OpenSSL 1.0.1 this has to be done in two stages.

RSA+MD5 is removed from supported signature algorithms extension:
any compliant implementation should never use RSA+MD5 as a result.

To cover the case of a broken implementation using RSA+MD5 anyway
disable lookup of MD5 algorithm in TLS 1.2.

Latest MIPS ISA specification declared 'branch likely' instructions
obsolete. To makes code future-proof replace them with equivalent.
(cherry picked from commit 0c2adb0a)

Performance improvement and Windows-specific bugfix (PR#3139).
(cherry picked from commit 9ed6fba2)

(I'd rather use an option, but it appears that the options field is
full.)

Now, we send the time in the gmt_unix_time field if the appropriate
one of these mode options is set, but randomize the field if the flag
is not set.

I'll be using this to make an option for randomizing the time.

Submitted by: Yuriy Kaminskiy
(cherry picked from commit 524b00c0)

Resolved conflicts:

	crypto/evp/e_des3.c

(cherry picked from commit 415ece73)

Return an error if an attempt is made to enable the Dual EC DRBG: it
is not used by default.

Instead, send random bytes.

Instead, send random bytes.

While the gmt_unix_time record was added in an ostensible attempt to
mitigate the dangers of a bad RNG, its presence leaks the host's view
of the current time in the clear.  This minor leak can help
fingerprint TLS instances across networks and protocols... and what's
worse, it's doubtful thet the gmt_unix_time record does any good at
all for its intended purpose, since:

    * It's quite possible to open two TLS connections in one second.
    * If the PRNG output is prone to repeat itself, ephemeral
    * handshakes (and who knows what else besides) are broken.

OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers.