(cherry picked from commit 5f8e9a47)

(cherry picked from commit 3143a332)

Keep copy of any host, path and port values allocated by
OCSP_parse_url and free as necessary.
(cherry picked from commit 5219d3dd)

(cherry picked from commit a74bee5f)

(cherry picked from commit 55c9e248)

Treat a zero length passed to ssleay_rand_add a no op: the existing logic
zeroes the md value which is very bad. OpenSSL itself never does this
internally and the actual call doesn't make sense as it would be passing
zero bytes of entropy.

Thanks to Marcus Meissner <meissner@suse.de> for reporting this bug.
(cherry picked from commit 5be1ae28)

A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
server.

Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> and Bodo Moeller <bmoeller@acm.org> for
preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
(cherry picked from commit 96db9023)

(cherry picked from commit 4e6c12f3)

(cherry picked from commit 997d1aac)

(cherry picked from commit 6eebcf34)

Enable TLS padding extension using official value from:

http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml
(cherry picked from commit cd6bd5ff)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES

Use bufsiz - 1 not BUFSIZ - 1 when prompting for a password in
the openssl utility.

Thanks to Rob Mackinnon, Leviathan Security for reporting this issue.
(cherry picked from commit 7ba08a4d)

(cherry picked from commit 6cc00684)

(cherry picked from commit dbb7654d)

New -hash_old to generate CRL hashes using old
(before OpenSSL 1.0.0) algorithm.
(cherry picked from commit de2d97cd)

A short PEM encoded sequence if passed to the BIO, and the file
had 2 \n following would fail.

PR#3289
(cherry picked from commit 10378fb5)

Add additional check to catch this in ASN1_item_verify too.
(cherry picked from commit 66e8211c)

Don't clear verification errors from the error queue unless
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR is set.

If errors occur during verification and SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR
is set return 2 so applications can issue warnings.

Some CMS SignedData structure use a signature algorithm OID such
as SHA1WithRSA instead of the RSA algorithm OID. Workaround this
case by tolerating the signature if we recognise the OID.
(cherry picked from commit 3a98f9cf)

(cherry picked from commit f04665a6)

Use a previously unused value as we will be updating multiple released
branches.
(cherry picked from commit 0737acd2)

Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140

Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix.
(cherry picked from commit 2198be34)

Conflicts:

	CHANGES

(cherry picked from commit a029788b)

(cherry picked from commit 7a3e67f029969620966b8a627b8485d83692cca5)

PR: 3275
(cherry picked from commit ea38f020)

The problem is that OpenSSH calls EVP_Cipher, which is not as
protective as EVP_CipherUpdate. Formally speaking we ought to
do more checks in *_cipher methods, including rejecting
lengths not divisible by block size (unless ciphertext stealing
is in place). But for now I implement check for zero length in
low-level based on precedent.

PR: 3087, 2775
(cherry picked from commit 5e44c144)

(cherry picked from commit 53e51612)

Submitted by: Roumen Petrov

Submitted by: Roumen Petrov
(cherry picked from commit 972b0dc3)