Specifies a callback that will, in the future, be used by the SSL code to
decide whether to abort a connection on Certificate Transparency grounds.

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The HOST_c2l() macro assigns the value to the specified variable, but also
evaluates to the same value. Which we ignore, triggering a warning.

To fix this, just cast it to void like we did in commit 08e55364


("Fix some clang warnings.") for a bunch of other instances.

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Tests included in future commit, which adds CT policy validation.

Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

and reorganize/harmonize post-conditions.

Additional hardening following on from CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

At the same time remove miniscule bias in final subtraction.
Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even with
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to be 4% for Sandy
Bridge and 7% on Broadwell.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Performance penalty is 2%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Performance penalty is 2% on Linux and 5% on Windows.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Performance penalty varies from platform to platform, and even
key length. For rsa2048 sign it was observed to reach almost 10%.

CVE-2016-0702

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

in s_server cmd:
specifying -trace option, falls through and turn-on security_debug

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using
an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|.
For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any
memory because |i * 4| is negative. This leaves ret->d as NULL leading
to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the
calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this
case memory is allocated to ret->d, but it is insufficiently sized
leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn.

This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever
called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is
anticipated to be a rare occurrence.

All OpenSSL internal usage of this function uses data that is not expected
to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line
arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based
on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security
consequences. This is also anticipated to be a rare.

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.

CVE-2016-0797

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

If the tests fail early before an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX is created then there
can be a use before init problem in asynctest.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Clarify that the "cleanup" routing does not get called if you invoke
ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_clear_fd() directly.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Implementation experience has shown that the original plan for async wait
fds was too simplistic. Originally the async logic created a pipe internally
and user/engine code could then get access to it via API calls. It is more
flexible if the engine is able to create its own fd and provide it to the
async code.

Another issue is that there can be a lot of churn in the fd value within
the context of (say) a single SSL connection leading to continually adding
and removing fds from (say) epoll. It is better if we can provide some
stability of the fd value across a whole SSL connection. This is
problematic because an engine has no concept of an SSL connection.

This commit refactors things to introduce an ASYNC_WAIT_CTX which acts as a
proxy for an SSL connection down at the engine layer.

Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

VisualStudio 2015 has a bug where an internal compiler error was occurring.
By reordering the DEFINE_STACK_OF declarations for SSL_CIPHER and SSL_COMP
until after the ssl3.h include everything seems ok again.

Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Fix "mixed declarations and code" warnings.
Use OpenSSL headers.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Add X25519 to TLS supported curve list.
Reject attempts to configure keys which cannot be used
for signing.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Check sign/verify blocked with X25519

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Add a flag to EC_METHOD for curves which do not support signing.
New function EC_KEY_can_sign() returns 1 is key can be used for signing.
Return an explicit error is an attempt is made to sign with
no signing curves.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

In some cases the EC_POINT and EC_KEY BIGNUM components are suboptimal
or inappropriate. Add an "custom_data" field which curves can populate with
a custom structure to suit their needs.

Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>