- May 03, 2016
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Viktor Dukhovni authored
The right variant is ~18 lines below. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Christian Bundy authored
This replaces the old SKIP primes with the most current Diffie-Hellman MODP groups defined by RFC 7296 and RFC 3526. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from GitHub https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/775)
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> CVE-2016-2107 MR: #2572
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Add tests for ASN.1 INTEGER: invalid tag, valid 0, 1, -1 and 0, -1 with illegal padding. Also add ASN1_ANY tests for 0, 1 and -1. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Only treat an ASN1_ANY type as an integer if it has the V_ASN1_INTEGER tag: V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER is an internal only value which is never used for on the wire encoding. Thanks to David Benjamin <davidben@google.com> for reporting this bug. This was found using libFuzzer. RT#4364 (part)CVE-2016-2108. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
With the EVP_EncodeUpdate function it is the caller's responsibility to determine how big the output buffer should be. The function writes the amount actually used to |*outl|. However this could go negative with a sufficiently large value for |inl|. We add a check for this error condition. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Due to the very large amounts of data involved this will most likely result in a crash. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate function is primarly used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2105 Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dmitry-Me authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Dmitry-Me authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. CVE-2016-2176 Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is like this: EVP_EncryptInit() EVP_EncryptUpdate() i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls this function directly. CVE-2016-2106 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- May 02, 2016
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reported by David Benjamin Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Date: Tue Mar 15 15:19:44 2016 +0100 This commit updates the documentation of cms, ocsp, s_client, s_server, and verify to reflect the new "-no_check_time" option introduced in commit d35ff2c0 on 2015-07-31. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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TJ Saunders authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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TJ Saunders authored
If no serverinfo extension is found in some cases, do not abort the handshake, but simply omit/skip that extension. Check for already-registered serverinfo callbacks during serverinfo registration. Update SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo() documentation to mention the need to reload the same serverinfo per certificate, for servers with multiple server certificates. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Use the environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR to find build file templates as well. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
The environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is used to indicate that there's a local directory with extra configuration files. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
As per a team decision back in 2014. Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Todd Short authored
Fix some of the variables to be (s)size_t, so that more than 1GB of secure memory can be allocated. The arena has to be a power of 2, and 2GB fails because it ends up being a negative 32-bit signed number. The |too_late| flag is not strictly necessary; it is easy to figure out if something is secure memory by looking at the arena. As before, secure memory allocations will not fail, but now they can be freed correctly. Once initialized, secure memory can still be used, even if allocations occured before initialization. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Rich Salz authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
This macro was defined by no-longer-supported __MWERKS__ compiler. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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Andy Polyakov authored
Usage of $ymm variable is a bit misleading here, it doesn't refer to %ymm register bank, but rather to VEX instruction encoding, which AMD XOP code path depends on. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- May 01, 2016
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FdaSilvaYY authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- Apr 29, 2016
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Matt Caswell authored
Some X509_STORE macros do not work since the type was made opaque. Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Sanity check field lengths and sums to avoid potential overflows and reject excessively large X509_NAME structures. Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reject zero length buffers passed to X509_NAME_onelne(). Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
This adds an explicit limit to the size of an X509_NAME structure. Some part of OpenSSL (e.g. TLS) already effectively limit the size due to restrictions on certificate size. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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