- Mar 07, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
Test that we check that key change messages appear on a record boundary. Reviewed-by:
Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2875)
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Matt Caswell authored
In TLSv1.3 the above messages signal a key change. The spec requires that the end of these messages must align with a record boundary. We can detect this by checking for decrypted but as yet unread record data sitting in OpenSSL buffers at the point where we process the messages. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
Also updates SSL_has_pending() to use it. This actually fixes a bug in SSL_has_pending() which is supposed to return 1 if we have any processed or unprocessed data sitting in OpenSSL buffers. However it failed to return 1 if we had processed non-application data pending. Reviewed-by:
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Pauli authored
Reviewed-by:
Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
Also, restore 1.0.2 behavior of looping over all BIO's in the chain. Thanks to Joseph Bester for finding this and suggesting a fix to the crash. Reviewed-by:
Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2651)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Exteneded feature flags were not pulled on AMD processors, as result a number of extensions were effectively masked on Ryzen. It should have been reported for Excavator since it implements AVX2 extension, but apparently nobody noticed or cared... Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
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Pauli authored
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- Mar 06, 2017
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Richard Levitte authored
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Richard Levitte authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Kurt Roeckx authored
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Rich Salz authored
[skip ci] Reviewed-by:
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Richard Levitte authored
Reviewed-by:
Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2851)
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Richard Levitte authored
For each platform, we may need to perform some basic checks to see that available tools perform as we expect them. For the moment, the added checkers test that Perl gives the expected path format. This should help MingW users to see if they run an appropriate Perl implementation, for example. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
And add a test case. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
Fixes #2847 Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 04, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
If early data is sent to a server, but ALPN is not used then memcmp is called with a NULL pointer which is undefined behaviour. Fixes #2841 Reviewed-by:
Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2845)
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Matt Caswell authored
We just check that if we insert a cookie into an HRR it gets echoed back in the subsequent ClientHello. Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
We do not allow the generation of TLSv1.3 cookies. But if we receive one in an HRR we will echo it back in the ClientHello. Reviewed-by:
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Andy Polyakov authored
If stderr is not redirected an uncatchable exception is thrown. Reviewed-by: -
Andy Polyakov authored
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Matt Caswell authored
A leak of an SSL_SESSION object can occur when decoding a psk extension on an error path when using TLSv1.3 Reviewed-by:
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- Mar 03, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
Commit d5aa14dd simplified the bn_expand_internal() and BN_copy() functions. Unfortunately it also removed some checks which are still required, otherwise we call memcpy passing in NULL which is not allowed. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Change tls12_sigalg_allowed() so it is passed a SIGALG_LOOKUP parameter, this avoids multiple lookups. When we copy signature algorithms return an error if no valid TLS message signing algorithm is present. For TLS 1.3 this means we need at least one signature algorithm other than RSA PKCS#1 or SHA1 both of which can only be used to sign certificates and not TLS messages. Reviewed-by:
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
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edelangh authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Bernd Edlinger authored
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Pauli authored
string means the same a kRSA. Reviewed-by:
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Rich Salz authored
CLA: trivial Reviewed-by:
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Matt Caswell authored
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- Mar 02, 2017
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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Matt Caswell authored
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