- Jan 06, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a protocol violation. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 4b4c1fcc) Conflicts: CHANGES doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod ssl/d1_srvr.c ssl/s3_srvr.c
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- Jan 05, 2015
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue. CVE-2014-3572 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b15f8769) Conflicts: CHANGES ssl/s3_clnt.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). CVE-2014-8275 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 208a6012) Conflicts: crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
(these are needed for certificate fingerprint fixes) Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 86edf13b)
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
According to X6.90 null, object identifier, boolean, integer and enumerated types can only have primitive encodings: return an error if any of these are received with a constructed encoding. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit f5e4b6b5) Conflicts: crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
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- Dec 17, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely, we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here. This reverts commit 1bb01b1b . Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- Nov 11, 2014
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- Oct 29, 2014
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit d45282fc)
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- Oct 28, 2014
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Samuel Neves authored
Signed-off-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- Oct 21, 2014
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Bodo Moeller authored
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Bodo Moeller authored
listed after TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. RT: 3575 Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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Kurt Roeckx authored
When we're configured with no-ssl3 and we receive an SSL v3 Client Hello, we set the method to NULL. We didn't used to do that, and it breaks things. This is a regression introduced in 62f45cc2 . Keep the old method since the code is not able to deal with a NULL method at this time. CVE-2014-3569, PR#3571 Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 392fa7a9)
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- Oct 20, 2014
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Tim Hudson authored
Reviewed-by: Geoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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- Oct 17, 2014
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Tim Hudson authored
so the Win32 compile picks it up correctly. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit e2e5326e)
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Richard Levitte authored
The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest... Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 8202802f) Conflicts: crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 55c7a4cf)
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Andy Polyakov authored
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 40155f40) Conflicts: e_os.h
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Kurt Cancemi authored
Reviewed-by: Ben Laurie <ben@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 87d388c9)
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- Oct 16, 2014
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
The 1**0 test will fail for FIPS capable builds because it uses the old BIGNUM code in the 1.2 FIPS module which can't be fixed. Reviewed-by: Emilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- Oct 15, 2014
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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Matt Caswell authored
Reviewed-by: Bodo Möller <bodo@openssl.org>
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Geoff Thorpe authored
CVE-2014-3568 Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
CVE-2014-3567 Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 90e53055939db40cf0fac1ad0c59630280aeee86)
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Bodo Moeller authored
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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Bodo Moeller authored
handling out of #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 section. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Bodo Moeller authored
Reviewed-by: Steve Henson <steve@openss.org>
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Bodo Moeller authored
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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- Sep 29, 2014
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Dr. Stephen Henson authored
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure, there is no known attack which can exploit this. Thanks to Brian Smith for reporting this issue. Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- Sep 25, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
Accidentally omitted from commit 455b65df Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit fdc35a9d)
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- Sep 24, 2014
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Emilia Kasper authored
Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to avoid a timing leak from padding failure. Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b55ff319) Conflicts: crypto/evp/Makefile crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
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Emilia Kasper authored
(Original commit adb46dbc ) Use the new constant-time methods consistently in s3_srvr.c Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit 455b65df) Conflicts: ssl/Makefile
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Adam Langley authored
that bad encryptions are treated like random session keys in constant time. (cherry picked from commit adb46dbc ) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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Emilia Kasper authored
Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods. Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1 This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>, as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL. Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org> Conflicts: crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
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- Sep 21, 2014
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Tim Hudson authored
that fixed PR#3450 where an existing cast masked an issue when i was changed from int to long in that commit Picked up on z/linux (s390) where sizeof(int)!=sizeof(long) Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (cherry picked from commit b5ff559f)
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